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ABSTRACT 
This thesis studies the Chinese economy, analyzing the economic growthChin~ 
has experienced since Deng Xiaoping instituted reforms in 1978. An autoregressive-
distributed lag method with an error correction model was used to forecast GNP growth. 
Three scenarios were constructed using high, medium, and low growth patterns. 
Sino-US relations are in the high end of a cyclical pattern. Economic policy is used 
as a tool for developing foreign policy in areas such as weapons proliferation and human 
rights. President Clinton's administration is using economic interaction to pursue a 
policy of engagement that is designed to work with PRC leaders, fostering a move away 
from Communism, toward a free market economy and democracy. 
PRC leaders demonstrated sound macroeconomic policies, despite the Asian 
economic crisis and the resulting decrease in market demand. PRC growth stems from 
increases in productivity and has taken advantage of underemployed workers as well as 
the opening of trade. The PRC faces substantial problems both from within and outside 
its borders. The country has a history of such problems and disruptions, yet it still 
realizes economic growth. The conclusion of this thesis is that the economic growth that 
the PRC has demonstrated is sustainable 
v 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the Chinese economy and analyze the 
economic growth that the country has experienced since Deng Xiaoping instituted 
reforms in 1978. The goal is to provide an answer to the question: Is the economic 
growth of the current PRC system sustainable? Critical factors that contributed to that 
economic growth, along with recent trends and developments, hold valuable information 
concerning the potential for continued growth. Included is a survey of existing literature 
concentrating on the factors that have PQtential for continued contributions to economic 
growth. The goal of the review is to make some sense of the great quantities of literature 
that have proliferated of late. To this base, economic forecasting was added to provide 
insight concerning specifics for future scenarios. Forecasts from prominent China 
watchers were studied and an autoregressive-distributed lag model was run to determine 
the long term relationship between investment and growth of GNP. 
Sino-US relations are in the high end of a cyclical pattern. Economic policy is 
used as a tool for developing foreign policy in areas such as weapons proliferation and 
human rights. President Clinton's administration is using economic interaction to pursue 
a policy of engagement that is designed to work with PRC leaders, fostering a move away 
from Communism, toward a free market economy and democracy. 
The PRC economic reform period consisted of three phases of reforms; each 
instituted as the PRC economy began to overheat and inflation increase. Each new phase 
of reforms accomplished its goal of reducing inflation and sustaining high growth. An 
area in which reforms were attempted but were not successful was the SOEs. SOEs 
remain a major source of waste and inefficiencies to this day. They do, however, provide 
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employment for millions of workers, and this makes reforms that eliminate or restructure 
SOEs controversial and difficult to institute because of the resulting rises in the number 
of unemployed. The reforms that were instituted established a healthy non-state sector 
and profitable TVEs that occupy a niche in the middle ground between the State and non-
state sectors. Deng's reforms have been criticized by some as haphazard and 
characterized by the Chinese term rrwshitouguohe "crossing the river by groping for 
stones along the way." .One must not be too critical of Deng's reforms, the PRC has 
realized growth levels of nine percent per year since 1978. 
The Rand Company sponsored a study of economic and military trends in 1989 
that forecasted future economic growth for several countries including the PRe. The 
1989 study predicted 4.7 percent growth for the period 1990-2000. In 1995, Rand again 
sponsored an economic and military trend study by several of the same authors using· the 
same method. This time the forecast developed two scenarios, one with stable growth 
predicting 4.9 percent growth (1994-2015), and a second disrupted growth scenario that 
forecast 3 percent growth over the same period. The authors conceded that their 
estimates were probably low. 
An autoregressive-distributed lag method with an error correction model was used 
to forecast GNP growth using its long run correlation with investment. Three scenarios 
were constructed using high, medium and low growth patterns. The high and low 
scenarios fit within the boundaries of established investment as a percentage of GNP in 
PRe history. 
xiv 
The future of PRe growth depends on a combination of internal and external 
factors and developments. Internal factors include human capital, SOEs, industrial and 
manufacturing, agriculture, infrastructure development, financial and service sector 
development, and political stability. External developments include PRe integration into 
the world economy and the Asian economic crisis. In order for the PRe to experience 
the high growth scenario, these items and developments must remain stable and positive. 
If major difficulties occur with any of the listed issues the PRe will experience low 
growth. The likely scenario is somewhere in the middle. 
This assessment of the PRe economy shows a system that has progressed through 
several stages and has demonstrated sound macroeconomic policies. This has continued 
despite the Asian economic crisis and the resulting decrease in market demand. Their 
growth is from increases in productivity and has taken advantage of underemployed 
workers and opening of trade. The PRe faces substantial problems both from within its 
borders and outside. The country has a history of significant problems and disruptions 
yet it still realizes economic growth. The conclusion of this thesis is that the economic 
growth that the PRe has demonstrated is sustainable. 
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In 1978, the People's Republic of China (PRC) President Deng Xiaoping 
established special economic zones along China's coastal region in an effort to develop a 
market economy while maintaining China's Communist system. Underutilized farm 
workers were transferred to industrial jobs in urban areas, increasing productivity. China 
developed from an agrarian economy into an industrial powerhouse. This growth is one 
of the greatest economic phenomena of the twentieth century, rivaling the United States' 
emergence in the early part of the century and the post World War II recoveries of Japan 
and Germany.1 
China's economic growth stems from reforms that include a combination of large 
capital investments, both from international and domestic sources; an increasingly 
productive labor force; and market oriented changes that increase profit incentives. 
These factors combine to give China positive long-term prospects. In the two decades 
since Deng's reforms began the Chinese economy has grown at a rate of roughly 9 per 
cent per year? PRC officials are pinning China's future on the belief that this type of 
growth is sustainable. 
1 Greg Mastel, The Rise a/the Chinese Economy, The Middle Kingdom Emerges, (New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, inc., 1977), 9. 
2 Organization for Economic Coperation and Development (OECD), China in the 21st Century Long-
term Global Implications, 1996, 3. 
The PRC appears to have built a foundation for growth rates to remain high for at 
least two more decades.3 The stability of this foundation is dependent on how the PRC 
economy deals with factors that work to disrupt economic momentum; these factors 
include forces from external and internal environments. Externally, these include issues 
such as the ongoing Asian financial crisis and political pressures exerted from other 
economic powers. Internally, factors that affect continued economic growth fall into four 
groups: infrastructural, .technological, organizational, and institutional.4 Because of 
China's importance, a forecast evaluating possible scenarios of future economic growth is 
necessary in order to design United States (US) policy responses 
B. RELEVANCY 
The current presidential administration believes that the US can use economic ties 
with China as an avenue to shape the PRC's political system. Economic engagement 
may be the initial bridge that will enable US policy makers to address such issues as the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction, international crime, environmental protection, 
human rights and regional stability in east and south Asia. Future economic growth in 
the PRC is an important matter for US national security no matter what scenario 
transpires. If China's economy continues to grow at a pace near that of the past two 
decades, it will become an economic giant, rivaling Japan for the position of Asian trade 
dominance. A policy of engagement will ensure that China and the US maintain relations 
and therefore, the potential remains for the US shaping of future ties. If PRC economic 
3 Zuliu Hu, "Why is China Growing So Fast?" International Monetary Fund Working Paper 96175, 
(IMP,1997). 
40ECD, China in the 21st Century Long-term Global Implications, 8. 
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growth is not sustained and the economy falls victim to unemployment problems or the 
on-going Asian economic crisis, US policy will be an important part of minimizing the 
damage done to both the US and world economies. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis will address the following question: 
Is the economic growth of the current PRC system sustainable? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
A growing body of economic analysis is focusing on many aspects of China's 
unique market socialism economic system including privatization and economic grow,th. 
This thesis will integrate recent economic developments, world economic trends, and 
patterns of market reforms for the purpose of forecasting the prospects of continued 
economic growth. Additionally, this thesis will evaluate the unique and changing 
relationship between privatization and state ownership in the PRC. This forecast will be 
applied to analyze implications for US foreign policy towards the PRe. 
E. OUTLINE 
Chapter II examines China's economic, cultural and political history up to 1978, 
when Deng Xiaoping instituted the reforms that he believed would enable the PRC to 
become a great power. This chapter explores the foundation of the dual track economic 
system that was to follow the reforms. Chapter II concludes with an assessment of the 
PRC economy just before the institution of Deng' s reforms. 
Chapter III outlines the reforms that Deng initiated which contributed to the 
exceptional economic growth in the PRe. The sequence of the reforms played an 
3 
important role in the development of the economy, as each phase was designed to build 
upon the successes of the previous phase or to correct problems encountered in earlier 
reforms. In addition, Chapter III identifies reforms aimed at the State Owned Enterprises 
(SOBs). 
Chapter IV examines the sources of growth in the PRC economy from 1978 to the 
present in order to determine which reforms will continue to produce economic growth in 
the future. This list will be the foundation upon which the subsequent forecasting 
exercise will draw to predict China's future course. 
Chapter V compares three analyses that forecast the PRC economic future. Points 
of focus are methodology and Gross National Product (GNP) growth. This will be 
followed by an exercise in which autoregressive-distributed lag (ARDL) and error 
correction modeling (ECM) will enable the identification of the relationship between 
GNP and gross domestic investment (GDI). 
Chapter VI is comprised of three sections, the first of which examines and lists 
critical domestic elements that should determine the future direction of the PRC 
economy. The second section of Chapter VI studies elel)1ents external to the PRC 
system. The third and final section of Chapter VI applies these elements to forecast the 
potential future of the PRC economy using the GNP/GDI relationship derived in the 
ARDL model developed in Chapter V. 
Chapter VII studies Sino-US relations and outlines the relationship between 
economic and foreign policy. This chapter also proposes future questions applicable to 
the field of this study. Chapter VIII concludes this thesis. 
4 
II. PRE REFORM HISTORY 
A. THE MIDDLE KINGDOM AND THE DYNASTIC CYCLE 
To understand the current PRC economy some historical information concerning 
China's Confucian beliefs, cultural legacy and history are necessary. This will help 
illuminate some of the inherent differences between western economic systems and that 
of the PRe. China has a lengthy history of prosperity that has only been overshadowed 
in the last century and a half by a diminished standard of living, which is now one of the 
lowest in the world. 
A few centuries ago, the Chinese considered themselves a vastly superior society 
that was literally the center of the world. All other societies were simply considered 
barbarians on the periphery of China's sphere of influence. The Chinese believed that 
they couid gain little by observing and interacting with the barbarians. The Chinese 
belief in their central position geographically, and the historical notion that they were the 
center of the world, is illustrated by their term for themselves: "The Middle Kingdom." 
The ways of the Middle Kingdom developed over thousands of years, marked by 
distinctly eastern religious beliefs, well-defined dynastic cycles, and periodic episodes of 
revolutionary violence and disorder.5 The legacy of this cultural arrogance is that the 
Chinese missed the opportunities of modem scientific and economic technology for many 
years. This greatly increased the distance that the fledgling Chinese market economy had 
to progress upon its institution in order to catch up with its neighbors. 
5 John K. Fairbanks, Edwin Reischauer, and Albert Craig, East Asia, Tradition & Transformation 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 20. 
5 
Chinese history is marked by dynastic cycles characterized by periods of a rise to 
high prosperity and wealth followed by corruption, over-taxation, rebellion and decline. 
In time, the maintenance of the system becomes costly, both economically and 
politically; the failure to sustain the accustomed standard of living leads to the decline. 
The downward spiral eventually results in collapse.6 Confucianism is an ethical 
institution in Eastern cultures, which serves as the equivalent of the Western culture's 
church, state, and private enterprise values. Confucianism provides social norms that 
keep the sense of the greater society and family superior to those of the individual.7 
Dynasties that are considered successful overcome the previous dynasty, follow 
Confucian virtues, and strengthen society. However, eventually even the successful 
dynasties succumb to corruption, over-taxation, famine, and rebellion and end in collapse 
as described above. 
The idea of the dynastic cycle is significant because it fosters the belief ~at the 
last century, considered "The Century of Shame," could mark the bottom of a dynastic 
cycle and signify that the Middle Kingdom is on the rise to a period of great wealth. In 
this scenario, the growing PRC economy is the engine that is destined to propel China to 
its inevitable peak. The validity of this issue rests in determining exactly where the PRC 
currently is in the cycle. 
6 J. Barker Rosser and Marina Rosser, Comparative Economics in a Transforming World Economy, 
(Chicago: McGraw-Hill Co., 1996) 360. 
7 Fairbanks, Reischauer, and Craig, East Asia, Tradition, & Transformation, 16. 
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,------------------ ----------------
B. THE CENTURY OF SHAME 
China suffered a hundred year decline of domestic and international esteem 
during what is tenned "The Century of Shame." This period started with the signing of 
the first of the unequal treaties (the treaty of Nanking in 1842), and lasted through the end 
of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. ill this century China was defeated, subjugated and 
repressed by country after country, first Britain then other Western powers, and finally 
Japan. 
China exited the Century of Shame in a position at the utter bottom of the 
dynastic cycle. A strong vacuum existed in Chinese culture and political leadership, 
which was readily filled by the Communist Marxist-Leninist ideology of Premier Mao 
Zedong. Mao rose to power riding on popular support left over from his people's war 
against the Nationalists, who were forced off the continent and onto the island of Taiwan. 
Mao and his followers used their tribulations from the Chinese civil war symbolically to 
represent their ability to overcome injustice. 
Chinese ideology gained valuable lessons from these periods that continue to 
prevail in the country today. Some of these are8: 
• Foreign powers, including Japan and western nations, desire to weaken 
and exploit China. 
• The Chinese must never again allow themselves to be overtaken. 
• China is in the position of uncompensated victim, and to this day, 
Chinese receive insufficient respect. 
8 Ideas for this concept originated in NS 3661, Summer Quarter, Naval Postgraduate School, Professor 
Denny Roy. 
7 
These lessons placed China in the position for a dynamic leader to capitalize on Chinese 
notions of superiority and implement a system to lead the nation back toward prosperity, 
Mao Zedong embodied that person. 
China's current economic system is an odd marriage of Mao's socialism and a 
market economy. Whether this is termed a dual track system or a "market economy with 
Chinese characteristics," there remains considerable influence from the Mao Zedong 
period. 
C. MAO ZEDONG AND COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY 
In the early 1940s, Mao utilized Confucian notions concerning land distribution to 
develop his ideology of full collectivization. This was similar to the system in the Soviet 
Union at that time. Common collectivization served to strengthen the PRC's alliance 
with the USSR in the early Cold War years. The PRC alliance with the USSR was short 
lived, however, as Mao's first disagreement with Soviet ideology came in 1950 with the 
beginning of the Korean War. He resented Stalin's reluctance to openly commit troops to 
aid the PRC in the struggle to overcome the ~estern threat to communism from the US 
This initiated tensions that would develop into the first Sino-Soviet split in 1957. As 
Mao's ideas concerning socialism and communism evolved, Chinese policy followed. 
He was strong in his belief of Leninist ideology, as exemplified in his support of Stalin 
against Tito's "revisionism" in 1948, and again in his objection to Khruschev's 
denouncement of Lenin in 1956. 
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Mao's ideas did differ from those of Stalin in at least five ways9: 
1) China emphasized the development of a rural economic base and a 
significant countryside populous. 
2) Mao stressed egalitarianism and Confucian based moral incentives as 
opposed to the Soviet emphasis of material incentives. 
3) The Chinese system stressed anti-bureaucratic attitudes. 
4) China's open opposition to established culture and traditional 
Confucian values is exemplified by Mao's campaign against the "four 
olds" (old customs, old habits, old culture and old thinking). 
5) Mao stressed regional decentralization of authoritative control of the 
economy. 
1. The PRe Economy Under Mao Zedong 
In the first years of Mao's leadership, China's economy prospered by riding the 
coat tails of the expanding Soviet system. Mao followed the Soviets advice concerning 
command central planning with heavy industrial buildup concentrated in the resource rich 
region of northeastern Manchuria, a place of traditional Soviet interest. Taking 
advantage of an industrial base that was originally developed during World War IT by the 
Japanese, China realized significant growth at the expense of the agrarian economy. 
Steel production grew at an annual rate of 31.8 percent, pig iron at 27.7 
percent, and cement at 29.3 percent, whereas grain output expanded at 
only 4.0 percent. Per capita kilocalorie availability rose from 2,048 in 
1953 to 2,217 in 1957 as rural per cfl.~ita pork consumption fell from 5.5 
kilograms to 4.4 over the same period. 0 
The implementation period of socialism and the Stalinist model is termed the first five-
year plan; further changes would be designated by the increments of time that would 
follow. 
The first Sino-Soviet split developed as Mao denounced the Soviet move away 
from traditional Leninist ideology. Soviet Premier Khruschev's reaction was to cut off 
9 Rosser and Rosser, Comparative Economics in a Transforming World Economy, 363. 
10 Ibid., 364. 
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economic and technical aid to China. The drastic reduction of money and technology 
from the Soviet Union, and a poor agricultural harvest, combined to lead Mao to institute 
"The Great Leap Forward" in 1958. His goal was to bolster rural-based industrialization 
using the existing level of technology, allowing the decentralized communes to produce 
their own mechanization for agricultural harvests. 
The communes had replaced the traditional Chinese market towns as the center 
for income accounting and distribution. This system would replace the entire family unit, 
and even went as far as to develop living dormitories. The move away from the 
traditional family unit ran contrary to traditional Confucian values, and it met with such 
resistance that the dormitories were abolished and the accounting unit was transferred up 
to the village level. Because of the many changes in control, inefficiencies developed 
causing severe problems. As Rosser and Rosser write: 
Rural industry developed in backyard production facilities, and pig iron 
and other basic industrial goods output increased in 1958-1959, although 
the quality was generally very poor. Industrial output growth accelerated 
in 1960 and fell sharply in 1961 as disorganization and catastrophe 
overwhelmed the economy.II 
Famine ensued and death rates in China were twice that in 1960 as in 1958. Lack of 
agriculture led to as many as 30 million deaths. Consumption fell from 4.6 kilograms per 
capita in 1958 to 1.2 in 1960. Due to distribution bottlenecks and inconsistencies in 
infrastructure, the famine was unevenly di.stributed throughout the countryside. 
A coalition that included Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping pressured Mao 
to accept blame for the state of the Chinese economy in 1962, which Mao did in a "self-
11 Ibid., 365. 
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criticism." More traditional central planning was reinstated. The emphasis on 
development was shifted to the agriculture sector instead of industry, with light industry 
being placed ahead of heavy. These moves combined with good growing seasons, and 
both agriculture and industry grew significantly. "Between 1961 and 1965 overall 
agricultural output rose at an annual rate of 9.4 percent and industrial production rose at 
an annual rate of 7.8 percent. Famine disappeared.,,12 The PRC system had survived a 
difficult period marked with many changes, but nothing was gained in the quest to raise 
the standard of living for the Chinese. 
During a debate in 1962 Deng endorsed a move away from central planning 
toward increased private family units and used the famous maxim: "It does not matter 
whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice." Later, during the Cultural 
Revolution this was used to denounce him as a "capitalist roader." This was, however, an 
indication that Deng had strong ideas that would foster the great growth of the r:eform 
period. The seed was planted that market-type reforms could be implemented in the 
PRe. 
In another of China's periodic episodes of tunnoil, Mao instituted "The Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in 1966. This was his response to rising dissatisfaction 
with the stagnant economic conditions that accompanied the Soviet style bureaucratic 
government of the PRe.13 Mao reacted to his outspoken critics by attempting their 
removal. This controlled program of removal turned into a revolution as Mao found 
widespread dissent within the party. In an attempt to promote "pure Communism" he 
12 Ibid., 365. 
13 Fairbanks, Reischauer, and Craig, East Asia, Traditio,n & Transformation, 959. 
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sent his Red Guards to attack the party elite (such as Deng) and intellectuals, to institute 
"reeducation." This produced anarchy throughout the countryside, ultimately leading to 
the People's Liberation Army's restoration of order and the mysterious death of the 
number two man in the party, Lin Biao. Deng, other members of party hierarchy, 
bureaucrats and intellectuals were attacked by Mao controlled factions of the military and 
incarcerated for reeducation. 14 
The crisis peaked in 1967 as chaos reigned throughout the countryside and Mao 
was forced to use the military to. restore order. This decade again retarded Chinese 
development and eliminated nearly an entire generation of intellectuals and scholars. 
Mao's implementations remained in place until his death in 1976 when Deng re-
established power and implemented his four modernizations: agriculture, industry, 
science and technology, and national defense. 
Mao's policy of national and regional self reliance caused a sharp decline in 
foreign trade from 4.245 billion US dollars in 1966 to 3.785 billion US dollars in 1968,15 
but domestic agricultural output and industrial production rose annually by 4.4 and 12.7 
percent respectfully from 1968 to 1978.16 . Domestic strife continued for several years 
after Mao's death in 1976. The move to self-reliance forced decentralization to local 
governmental units for planning and administration. A "Third Front" was developed to 
promote industrial expansion well within Chinese borders, countering fears of a Soviet 
14 Rosser and Rosser, Comparative Economics in a Transforming World Economy, 366. 
IS Carl Riskin, China's Political Economy: The Quest/or Development Since 1949, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987),208, Quoted in Rosser and Rosser, 366. 
16 Alvin Rabushka, The New China: Comparative Economic Development in Mainland China, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong, (Bolder, Westview Press, 1987), 208. Quoted in Rosser and Rosser, 366. 
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invasion or a US attack of the industrially significant coastal regions. This internal 
development of infrastructure would be significant to later growth in the PRC. During 
this time, the PRC system showed resilience repeatedly as it weathered major economic 
and political disruptions that could have caused total collapse. 
The World Bank produced a 1992 report that outlined China's economy before 
Deng Xiaoping's 1978 reforms. The report noted that the PRC system at this time was 
atypical of the standard .Soviet model and other reforming socialist systems. The most 
important differences were in the areas of health and education. This gave the PRC an 
advantage that would make the difference between PRC growth and the Soviet block's 
problems in the decades to follow. Furthermore, the World Bank noted that China was 
not in a position of macroeconomic financial crisis in 1977 "which removed the need for 
a strong dose of deflationary' policy to accompany the launching of reforms. 17 
D. BUREAUCRACY 
One element that proved to be a burden on the PRC economy during the reform 
period was the Communist style bureaucratic legacy. A position in the Chinese 
governing structure was traditionally seen as a path for wealth and high status in 
Confucian societies, and post civil war China was no different. Unfortunately, 
authoritarianism and corruption were the status quo as the salaries were not sufficient to 
cover the trappings of the assigned offices. 18 Another characteristic of the Mao era 
17"ChinaReform and the Role of the Plan in the 1990s," World Bank Country Study (World Bank, 
1992),34. 
18 NS3661 course at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, 9 July 1998, Professor Denny 
Roy. 
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bureaucracy was a hesitancy to make controversial decisions, as any discontent from the 
governing body was often accompanied by with harsh retribution. As Minxin Pei writes: 
The Chinese political system Deng Xiaoping inherited in 1978 resembled 
a Hobbesian world. No norms governed elite politics. Its key 
governmental institutions, especially the legal system and the bureaucracy, 
had been seriously damaged by the economic and political turmoil of the 
Great Leap Forward of 1958 and the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution. There 
were no institutions of political campaigns and mob violence had been the 
main form of participation. Deng was faced with rebuilding China's 
wrecked political system and reforming its backward economy at the same 
time. 19 ' 
Party performance was hampered by low turnover rates, and therefore, aged ministers and 
vice-ministers who had low levels of education. In the period before the reforms, the 
average age of provincial leaders was 62 and only 20 percent were college educated.2o 
Another institution that would offer stiff resistance to economic reforms was the 
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) that Mao had used to institute the Cultural Revolution. 
From the time when Defense Minister P'eng Te-huai was replaced with General Lin Biao 
in 1959 for criticizing Mao's Great Leap Forward the PLA became an important tool of 
the Communist Party. The PLA would develop into its own bureaucracy and be a 
stakeholder in the status quo. 
E. PRC ECONOMIC POTENTIAL IN 1978 
China's stable condition going into the reform period,of 1978 eliminated the need 
to focus on a deflationary policy, the PRC could capitalize on already high levels of 
~avings. Prior to the reforms the PRC had experienced good levels of growth, as in the 
period between 1952 and 1978. Growth in the PRC at this time averaged between 6 and 
19 Minxin Pei, "Is China Democratizing?", Foreign Affairs, J an/Feb 1998, 69. 
20 Ibid., 71. 
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9.7 percent.21 China also was enjoying a high level of human capital endowment. This is 
significant in that human capital fosters an increase in output, and therefore, furthers 
economic growth. However, as will be discussed later, this endowment is susceptible to 
diminishing returns. Fortunately the PRC had large numbers of agrarian workers who 
were underutilized on the rural farms; this is extra productivity just waiting to produce. 
Low wage levels increased the potential of China's workforce even more. At this time, 
workers tended to be relatively young and because of efforts to stem the population, 
laborers had relatively few dependent minors for which to be responsible. Another 
statistic that separated the PRC from other emerging market countries, and represented 
potential for growth, was the relatively high life expectancy of 65. 
However, a few problems were barriers to the future of the Chinese economy in 
1977. These included slowing growth rates of living standards and agricultural 
production levels. Also significant were the inherent inefficiencies of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) system at the time. These inefficiencies caused a deterioration 
of industrial planning and general waste of factor inputs. 
A major flaw in the pre-reform PRC economic system was the lack of exposure to 
foreign trade. China was in a position to take advantage of the other so called East Asian 
Tigers that included Japan and South Korea, each experiencing great booms of economic 
growth and technical advancement. Its location potentially enabled China to receive a 
technology transfer that could bolster production efficiency. Although Hong Kong was 
under British control at the time, it also represented a credible source for capital 
21 Susumu Yabuki, China's New Political Economy, The Giant Awakes, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1995),20. 
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investment and a high capacity port through which the PRC could conduct trade to the 
rest of the world. 
Deng did not institute his 1978 reforms simply to create economic growth. China 
had everything required to sustain moderate, long-term growth even without Deng's 
reforms. China had experienced decades of reasonable growth; Deng was concerned 
with the lack of improvement in productivity. The PRC system required ever increasing 
levels of investment to maintain constant levels of output, preventing gains in personal 
consumption. An Oxford Review on Economic Policy summarizes Deng's motivations: 
Dissatisfaction with the "extensive" growth model that had generated 
overall growth, but little if any improvement in productivity, and required 
increasing levels of investment to be maintained, thus preventing 
significant gains in personal consumption; and ... a political rejection of 
the extremes of "leftism" associated in particular with the period of the 
"Cultural Revolution. ,,22 
Keeping with the beliefs that he had articulated before the Cultural Revolution, Deng 
sought a more successful system for the PRe. 
22 World Bank Country Study, 34. 
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III. DENG XIAOPING'S REFORMS 
This review of the post 1978 reforms will concentrate on measures that were 
instituted which were actually effective at increasing economic growth in the PRC. 
Reform of the SOEs is included because of the significance of that sector and the 
emphasis on SOE reforms in each phase. Economic reform under Deng came in three 
phases. Significant events are outlined below. 
A. PHASE I: AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL REFORMS (1978·83) 
The first phase of the reforms was designed to counter existing institutional 
factors, which inhibited productivity. The system reinstated the practice of linking 
rewards with effort, which had existed in China prior to 1958. 
Significant reforms: 
• Land leased to farmers under the household responsibility system 
• Higher procurement prices for key crops 
• Introduction of the two-track price system 
• Open economic zones established in coastal regions to: 
~ Attract foreign investment . 
~ Promote exports 
~ Serve as laboratories for future market oriented reforms 
• Scale back the planning system for state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
~ Link bonuses more closely to performance 
~ Establish tighter links between wages and productivity 
The agricultural sector appears to be the jumping off point for PRC reforms. This 
area was underdeveloped in 1978 and offered a prime opportunity for quick results. 
Increases in agricultural efficiency would also generate required savings rates and 
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provide a source of surplus labor from displaced farm workers. Initial agricultural 
reforms were successful, increasing both total output and productivity. Between 1978 
and 1984 the increase in grain output was greater than in the proceeding two decades. 
This came at a time when total agricultural investment was at its lowest since 1949.23 
This growth was almost completely due to increases in labor productivity, as there were 
no technological transformations. 
Not all of the reforms were new, several programs were similar to others which 
had been imposed previously in the post World War II period and then dropped because 
of perceived failure. In addition, Deng initiated an Open Door policy that was unique in 
Chinese history. The policy established Special Economic Zones (SEZs) to stimulate 
trade with foreign markets. In these zones ownership, tax, investment, material, and 
wage poliCies were instituted that would make the areas receptive to Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI). There was also a reallocation of resources, which emphasiz~d the 
profitable consumer-goods industries instead of the input-intensive heavy industry. This 
produced an increase in manufacturing productivity and bolstered the consumer goods 
available. The growth experienced in Phase I was consumption led, as the consumer 
goods sector showed quick returns based on the short time from production to 
consumption.24 The success of this phase, especially in rural reforms, led to the 
implementation of the next phase. 
23 "China," Oxford Review o/Economic Policy, Vol. 11 No.4 (Winter 1995), 6. 
24 Ibid., 8. 
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B. PHASE II: BROADENING OF REFORMS (1984-91) 
The second phase was marked by a shift to reforms in the urban sector and 
industry, which took advantage of the increased savings and surplus labor that resulted 
from the rural reforms. 
Significant Reforms: 
• Experiment to grant SOEs more autonomy in production/employment decisions 
• Extensions of two track system to industrial prices 
• Other types of enterprises (such as urban collectives) gain importance 
• Bank reform that "included establishment of the People's Bank as the central bank 
• Fiscal reforms implemented so that: . 
~ Enterprises could retain larger share of profits 
~ Enterprise tax introduced to replace profit transfers 
• Trade and exchange system reforms that included 
~ Number of SEZs· expanded 
)- Foreign trade plan scaled back 
)- Swap centers for the trading of retained exchange 
)- Further increases in decentralization 
Increased decentralization was recognized in the form of township and village 
enterprises (TVEs). Part of the non-state sector of the dual track system, TVEs are given 
tax advantages and local government support as a shelter from the centralized persuasion 
of the Communist Party. In the second phase of the reforms, TVEs increased 
significantly in number and therefore industrial output. As the Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy notes: 
In 1978 the number of TVEs stood at 1.5m and employed 28.3m workers. 
In 1983, the number of TVEs had actually fallen to 104m. However, the 
next year, in 1984, their number shot up dramatically to 6.1m. By 1993, 
there were 24.5m TVEs employing 123.5m workers (State Statistical 
Bureau, 1994).,,25 
25 Ibid., 9. 
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Three significant issues are derivatives of TVE growth. First, the tax that accrued 
from TVEs went primarily to local governments, which then were able to reinvest the 
funds outside traditional centralized channels, establishing new consumer preferences iIi 
an emerging market. This would become significant, as government income would fall 
and SOEs share of output dropped. Second, consumer confidence and investment grew, 
providing for further investment into rural TVEs generating a growing spiral of 
productivity. Third, the state, at the local level was able to playa critical role in fostering 
the development of TVEs, providing legitimacy to the state's role in the development of a 
market economy. 
Phase IT reforms marked a drastic increase in numerical growth in the non-state sector 
and with it came increased economic growth. This growth brought about a decrease in 
macroeconomic controls and, in tum, increased inflationary pressures usually associated 
with an overheating economy_ This brought on the need for reforms designed to improve 
the financial infrastructure. In addition, a "rectification'" period saw the slowing of 
reforms designed to lessen inflationary pressures. Deng recognized the need for 
accelerated reforms and the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Central Committee in 1993 
articulated the goal of creating a "Socialist Market Economy" with the third phase. 
C. PHASE In: DEEPENING OF REFORMS (1992 TO PRESENT) 
The third phase was marked with reforms in foreign trade, taxation and 
investment. This represented a significant shift away from a planned system in favor of a 
market type economy. The major area of focus however, was in policy concerning SOEs. 
The system of contracting for SOEs was modernized to increase efficiency. Like poliCies 
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affecting SOEs in the previous two phases, the Phase III changes were not effective in 
altering SOE problems. 
Significant Reforms: 
• Market forces dedicated to playing a primary role in resource allocation 
• Strengthen and develop infrastructure for better macroeconomic control 
• Increase market orientation by: 
~ Widening central bank reforms 
~ Widening of financial sectors 
~ Fiscal system improved 
~ Exchange and trade system improved 
• Accelerate SOE reforms 
Chart 1 shows PRC output growth and inflation for the years after Deng implemented 
the reforms. The reform period shows four distinct cycles (1978-81, 81-87, 87-91, 91-
present) where a drop in output was countered by a new phase of reforms. In addition, of 
note is the relationship between the two series, inflation lagged slightly behind output, 
but follows the same cycles. This is indicative of sound macro economic policies. 
n In Chart 1. 4 Cycles of Output Growth and Inflation 
rercent crease , 
25r--------.------------~----------~------------~ 
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The Oxford Review of Economics asserts that Deng's approach to reform began with no 
clear path or stated endpoint.. It is not even obvious if he had a market economy in mind 
as he implemented the original reforms. This trial and error style is what the Chinese call 
moshitouguohe, "crossing the river by groping for stones along the way.,,26 The next 
logical step is to identify the sources of growth and determine the results of the reforms to 
facilitate forecasting the future of the PRC economy. 
26 Ibid., 6. 
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IV. SOURCES OF GROWTH IN THE PRC ECONOMY 
Identification and categorization of the sources for economic growth are critical to 
enable the forecasting of a system's future. Only certain types of growth are sustainable. 
For example, in the neoclassical model, growth derived from direct factor inputs; labor 
and capital will run into diminishing returns and contribute a decreasing proportion to 
output. 27 Diminishing returns, a characteristic of the capital and labor inputs, signifies 
that an increase in either input will, over time, contribute less to the increase in output. 
Using this model, an increase in capital or labor is essentially a one-time boost to output. 
An increase in the intensive factors (an example of which is increased productivity), on 
the other hand, does not suffer from diminishing returns and can lead to continued 
increase in output. 
Recent economic literature concerning economic growth in the PRC has focused 
on that economy's sources of growth. These include: an International Monetary Fund 
(IMP) study by Zuliu Hu and Mohsin Khan, Eduardo Borensztein and Jonathan Ostry 
writing for the American Economic Review, Charles Wolf, Jr., K. C. Yeh, Anil Bamezai, 
Donald P. Henry and Michael Kennedy writing for the Rand Co., and a study by the 
World Banle There is no doubt that the PRC has experienced four decades of strong 
growth. The real issues are how the growth occurred, how it changed over time, and 
whether it is sustainable into the long-term future. 
27 Anonymous, "Economic Growth, Explaining the Mystery," The Economist 322, no. 7740 (January 
4,1992). 
23 
Agricultural growth provided a larger portion of non-state sector growth from 
1978 to 1984 than from 1984 to 1993. This is indicative of a one-time boost in 
productivity experienced in the first years after reforms established household farming 
units?8 
During the pre-reform period, a significant amount of the agricultural labor was 
underemployed. This is significant because as workers moved into the industry and 
service sectors their activities became a more important source of productivity growth. In 
1978, agricultural employment was more than 70 percent of the workforce, this fell to 54 
percent in 1994.29 This shift enabled a dramatic rise in the number of non-state 
enterprises over the reform period. Tens of millions of the displaced workers moved to 
the value added manufacturing sector where they were more productive. 
China's non-state sector of the economy grew much faster than the state sector, 
which is comprised of many SOBs. Table 1 shows growth rates for various sub sectors of 
the PRC economy from 1979 to 1993. That period is also broken into two parts, 1979-84 
and 1985-93. The non-state sector includes agriculture (mostly at the household level), 
rural industry, private enterprise, urban collectives and joint ventures. 
28 Jeffrey Sachs and Wing Thye Woo, "Understanding China's Economic Performance," National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 5935, 10. 
29 Zuliu Hu and Mohsin Khan, "Why is China Growing So Fast?" IMF Working Paper (JMF, July 
1996), 14. 
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Table 1: Compound Growth Rate by Sector, and Ownership in the Industrial Sector 
Primary sector 
Industrial State Owned Enterprises 
Industrial Cooperative Owned Enterprises 
Individual-owned Industrial Enterprises 























Construction Sector 10.6 10.2 10.9 
Tertiary Sector 10.0 10.8 9.4 
Memo Item: Industrial non-SOEs 21.2 16.4 24.5 
Growth rates calculated from series that have been consistently re-based on 1990 prices. 
N/A=growth rates for 1979-84 and 1979-93 for industrial enterprises that are 
individually owned or of "other ownership form" cannot be calculated because their 
output levels in 1978 were zero. 
Source: Sachs and Woo Table 3 
The establishment of SEZs attracted large amounts of FDI, which had been 
almost zero in the pre 1979 period. By 1994, cumulative FDI reached $95.6 billion (US). 
Furthermore, the joint ventures and foreign owned enterprises received significant 
technological and managerial expertise spillover from outside of the system. These 
ventures produced items that transferred China into an export powerhouse. Hu and Khan 
expand this idea: 
Manufacturing exports in particular had been expanding in U.S. dollar 
terms at 19 percent a year in the 1981-94 period. The ratio of trade to 
national output increased from a little over 10 percent in 1978 to over 60 
percent by 1994.30 
30 Ibid., 14. 
25 
This indicates that the PRC economy was in a position for reforms to increase 
productivity and to spur growth. 
Beyond privatization and agricultural reform, China experienced considerable 
growth in the export sector. This is similar to models of other Asian countries. The 
export sector optimized the growing liberalization of China's private enterprise, since 
many exports come form the non-state sector, specifically TVEs and private firms. 
Exports from private enterprises were often financed with foreign investment. 
Of China's reforms, Sachs and Woo recognize two different schools concerning 
the method in which this growth developed, the experimentalist, and the convergence.31 
The experimentalist school believes that China's success is based on the specific 
evolution of programs that were intentionally designed to maintain both the Communist 
party system and a growing economy. The second school, the convergence, believes that 
PRC success is a result of harmonization with neighboring non-socialist market 
economies, the Asian Tigers. Furthermore, the convergence school states "that the 
'innovative' non-capitalist institutions are responses to China's political circumstances 
and not to its economic circumstances.,,32 The main difference between the two schools 
comes down to assessing the sources of economic growth in the PRC economy. The 
experimentalist school attributes the growth essentially to being in the right place at the 
right time with the right policy concerning trade. Gains in GNP growth from the opening 
to foreign trade would be more difficult to sustain than productivity gains from a 
systematic evolution. 
31 Sachs and Woo, "Understanding China's Economic Performance." 
32 Ibid, Introduction. 
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Table 2. Summary of Key Differences Between Experimentalist and Convergence 
Schools 
Experimentalist School Convergence School 
Reasons for gradualism Economic experimentation Political compromise; 
ideological commitment to 
state ownership 
Outcomes in the SOEs Substantial improvements Little technical progress; 
in production efficiency and over-compensation of 
SOE personnel and over-
investment that weaken the 
fiscal situation 
Source: Sachs and Woo, Table 2. 
Sachs and Woo admit that the real system is probably a'mix of the ideals of the 
two schools, but they side with convergence. Of the most recent growth Sachs and Woo 
write: 
In our view, the recent trend, quite strongly, has been towards 
harmonization rather than innovation. In our understanding, this trend 
towards harmonization is the result of internal pressures as well as explicit 
external pressures towards harmonization, such as China's quest to join 
the World Trade Organization.,,33 
Additionally, Sachs and Woo write about the apparent gradualism of Deng's reforms: 
The convergence school also holds that China's' gradualism results 
primarily from a lack of consensus over the proper course, with power still 
divided between market reformers and old-style socialists; and that the 
"innovative" non-capitalist institutions are responses to China political 
circumstances and not to its economic circumstances.34 
33 Ibid., 42. 
34 Ibid., Abstract 
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This paragraph implies that China was forced to boost national wealth by promoting a 
market economy while at the same time, ensuring that the party leaders maintained 
wealth and influence. 
It is important to note that PRC economic growth increased immediately after the 
initiation of reforms. Hu and Khan, writing for the IMF, do give credit to foreign trade, 
but their orientation is mostly toward convergence. They believe that the gradual pace of 
program implementation helped the move toward privatization, fostering competition and 
therefore, efficiency. They explain the sources of the initial gains as follows: 
Relatively high savings and investment rates (averaging around 35 percent 
of GDP); improvements in the structure of incentives and ownership; a 
relatively well-trained labor force; and the gradual opening of the 
economy to foreign trade and investment, as well as linkages with Hong 
Kong, China and Taiwan Province of China, which account, in particular, 
for a large share of direct investment in mainland China. China is also 
seen as having benefited from the "advantages" of backwardness, notably 
the potential for significant productivity improvements related to the 
transfer of resources out of low-productivity agriculture into 
manufacturing.35 
The differences between the two schools described by Sachs and Woo are 
described in Table 2. 
IMF and World Bank researchers attempted to categorize these causes in order to 
predict sustainability. Hu and Khan in an IMF study, used the neoclassical model to 
study the growth of the PRC economy. Of this method, they wrote: "It is an appropriate 
first step in looking at the Chinese economy and yields useful 'benchmark' estimates for 
future research.,,36 They found that while increases in labor and capital inputs did 
35 International Monetary Fund, "China- Growth and Economic Reforms," (1997), 123. 
36 Hu and Khan, "Why is China Growing So Fast?" 4. 
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contribute significant growth during the reform period, the largest portion of growth was 
caused by increases in productivity. The results of both the IMF study and the World 
Bank study are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3. China: Alternative Estimates of the Sources of Economic Growth 




Output 5.8 9.3 
Physical capital input. 6.2 7.7 
Labor Input 2.5 2.7 
Human capital input 
Residual 1.1 3.9 
Proportions of output growth accounted for by 
Physical capital input 65.2 45.6 . 
Labor input 16.8 12.8 
Human Capital input 













Residual 18.0 41.6 46.0 
Sources: Zuliu Hu and Mohsin S. Khan, "Why Is China Growing So Fast?" Staff Papers, 
IMP Vol. 44 (March 1997), 103-31, World Bank, China 2020: Challenges in the 21st 
Century (Washington, 1997). 
Numbers may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
The residual from Table 3 is important and cannot be overstated for its use in 
determining future growth possibilities. The IMP provides three potential causes for this 
residual: mismeasurement of output growth, sectoral reallocation of resources, and 
general improvements in productivity. Mismeasurement could be caused by an 
"overestimate of economic growth caused by under-deflation of nominal OUtpUt.,,37 
37 Ibid., 23. 
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Productivity could l?e improved by the reallocation of resources from low to high 
productivity sectors. This intensive factor has potential for future productivity gains. 
Finally, general improvements are also intensive and studies do support the theory that 
non-state sector firms operate more efficiently than SOEs. The last two possible causes 
signify that the growth from this productivity increases and is therefore sustainable. 
Chart 2. Sources of Economic Growth 





Source: Hu and Khan, 2b. 
Economic Reform Period (1979-94) 
Productivity 
18% 
Chart 2 shows the IMF findings concerning sources of economic growth from 
1953-1994 divided into the central planning period and the post reform period. The 
contributions to growth from capital and labor were surpassed by increases from 
productivity. This provides a strong argument against the findings of Sachs and Woo. 
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The IM:F study points out that in the pre-reform period of 1952 to 1978, capital 
formation was responsible for 65 percent of the economic output while productivity 
increases were responsible for 18 percent of the growth. In the post reform period untiT 
the time of the study (1979 - 1994) productivity increases were responsible for 42 
percent of the growth. Even more optimistically, in the period between 1990 and 1994, 
an increase in productivity was responsible for more than half of the growth in output 
while capital formation produced one third of the growth. This study also recognized that 
the original reforms produced significant growth, a main part of which was caused by 
physical investment. These findings signify that the importance of investment declined 
in the last decade when compared to productivity. This is important because productivity 
does not suffer from diminishing returns, thus promoting the sustainability of the growth. 
Hu and Khan identified four of the market-oriented reforms implemented in 1978 
as responsible for the rapid growth of productivity in the post reform period found by Hu 
and Khan. These are reallocation of labor from agriculture to service sectors, rise of the 
non-state sector, China's "open door" policy (exemplified by SEZs), and export 
increases. The non-state sector benefited by the reallocation of labor and, in much the 
same manner, export income benefited from China's open door policy. 
The conclusion that is drawn by the IM:F rules out mismeasurements and 
attributes the residual to productivity increases. The PRC's economic growth is in fact 
sustainable, since the growth is caused by increases in efficiency or production, which is 
not susceptible to diminishing returns. The IM:F states: 
China's strong productivity growth, spurred by the 1978 market-oriented 
reforms, is the leading cause of China's unprecedented economic 
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performance. Despite significant obstacles relating to the measurement of 
economic variables in China, these findings hold up after various tests for 
robustness. As such, they offer an excellent jumping-off point for future 
research on the potential roles for productivity measures in other 
developing countries.38 
Hu and Khan address the opposing views to their research: 
Therefore, the evidence from this study points to a somewhat different 
conclusion from that reached by Sachs and Woo (1996). Even though the 
efficiency gains brought about by earlier agricultural reforms may have 
dissipated, the sharp growth in the rural industry, the surge in foreign 
direct investment, the export boom, the further dismantling of the central 
planning system and the increasing market-orientation in the state-owned 
sector, have combined to boost aggregate productivity growth in the 1985-
94 period, and even more so during 1990-94.39 . 
This identifies the differences between the PRC model and other Asian high-growth 
economies. Sachs and Woo stress that the growth is not the result of actual innovation, 
but harmonization with non-socialist economies. This would imply that the PRC is on 
the same road as South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Japan, only a couple of decades 
behind. They infer that if China suffers from problems similar to its neighbors, then the 
PRC economic growth might not be sustainable. Hu and Khan assert that as the reforms 
accelerated in the 1990 to 1994 period, the total factor productivity (TFP) grew at 
astonishing rates. The increasing value of output, other than capital in TFP, signifies that 
the PRC system is gaining from programs implemented, in contrast to other non-socialist 
countries. 
This chapter outlines sources of post-reform economic growth in the PRC that 
will be combined with a forecast using the contribution of investment to Gross National 
38 Ibid., 6. 
39 Ibid., 20. 
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Product (GNP) in later chapters to predict possible future scenarios. The reforms enabled 
underemployed workers to be more productive in other forms of production while 
providing greater incentives for the remaining agriculture workers. These incentives 
boosted the initial growth that was seen in the agriculture sector. The opening of trade 
capitalized on the available labor (although disproportional in the coastal region) to gain 
productivity in higher value added sectors. Furthermore, the establishment of SEZs 
enabled an increase of capital in the form of FDI, which further boosted trade. 
The various phases of the reform maintained productivity increases while at the 
same time, keeping the economy from totally overheating. This is indicative of sound 
macro economic policy from a developing country perspective. 
33 
, V. ECONOMIC FORECASTING 
In this section, a review of several existing forecasts will be compared to one 
performed sp~cifically for this study. This study of economic growth focuses on 
increases in Gross National Product (GNP). There are many economic indicators that can 
be analyzed in an economic growth-type study; a list from a Rand Corporation study 
includes 
Exports and imports, capital flows, per capita income, domestic capital 
formation, resource allocations for research and development and science 
and technology, international holdings of assets and liabilities, 
demographic changes, and so on.40 
Several of these items will be discussed in more detail in the following section. The 
choice of GNP as the center of analysis is based on several reasons. Charles Wolf, et. al 
consider GNP to be the most useful single indicator of economic size for comparisons 
over long periods of time. In addition, many of the indicators listed above are functions 
of GNP and can therefore be predicted in terms of percentage of GNP. The availability 
of quality data concerning the PRC ~cononi.y is suspect, forcing the use of a basic and 
widely used indicator drawn from a single source to limit errors from reporting 
inefficiencies. 
A. PUBLISHED FORECASTS 
A 1989 estimate of economic and military trends was conducted as part of Rand's 
International Economic Policy program, sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary 
40 Long-term Economic and Military Trends, 1950-2010, The Rand Corporation, (1989),2. 
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of Defense for Policy. The 1989 Rand study applied an aggregate national production 
function by using capital, labor, and factor productivity as inputs to produce an estimated 
GNP as the output. The study predicted growth rates for the PRe of 4.7 percent (1990-
2000) and 4.7 percent (2000-2010)41. The predicted number for the 1990 to 2000 period 
appears low compared to the actual average between 1990 and 1996 of 10.82 percent.42 
The 1989 Rand study did outline the uncertainty involved with conducting this type of 
exercise on the PRC economy. Two major sources of error identified were GNP 
estimation errors caused by currency conversion,43 and estimation errors caused by the 
indirect calculation of military spending and capital stock. The authors of this study do 
recognize the possibility that their forecast is on the low side. Of note, concerning this 
study is the findings concerning the Soviet Union (USSR). The forecast did recognize 
that the USSR was at a point of uncertainty with respect to President Gorbachev's polices 
and perestroika. In an example of the difficulty of predicting the unforeseen, the study 
did not however, predict the collapse of the USSR economic system 
Some of the same writers (Charles Wolf, JR., Donald P. Henry and Michael 
Kennedy) produced another Rand report in 1995 that again predicted long term trends, 
this time for the period 1994-2015. This study included only five Asian countries and the 
United States. The 1995 study again used GNP increases as an indicator of growth and 
compared the countries studied in tef!I1s of purchasing power parity (PPP). A 
hierarchically linked model derived GDP by comparing demographic data, military 
41 Ibid., 8. 
42 The World Bank, World Tables 1997, CD ROM edition (1997). 
43 The 1989 Rand study compared several different economies in terms of GNP growth. This method 
required the conversion of all currency figures form local money into US dollars. 
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spending and military capital stock. In computing China's GDP growth, the 1995 study 
assumed two alternative scenarios:44 
1. A "stable-growth" scenario, in which capital fOlmation and factor 
productivity are higher (although still well below their actual levels in 
recent years), resulting in an average annual growth of 4.9 percent over the 
1994-2015 period. 
2. A "disrupted-growth" scenario, in which turmoil and disruption are 
assumed to accompany a possible leadership succession crisis, and in 
which some degree of regional fragmentation ensues. The result is to 
lower the rate of capital formation and factor productivity growth, yielding 
an average annual GDP growth of 3 percent over the period. 
The "disrupted-growth" scenario still produced GDP growth rates for the PRC higher 
than the predicted levels of GDP growth in the United States (2.2 percent). Under the 
"stable-growth" scenario, the PRC GNP is predicted to surpass that of the US 
approximately 2006 and military spending of the PRC will surpass that of the US· in 
approximately 2002. The per capita level of GNP for the PRC is forecast to lag well 
behind that of the US and Japan for both scenarios. 
B. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT CORRELATED WITH INVESTMENT 
The above studies linked the supply side of the PRC economy in their models to 
predict future growth in GNP. A valuable addition to these would be an investigation of 
the relationship between GNP and Gross Domestic Investment (GDI). Two definitions 
are necessary for the purpose of this study. 
GNP at market prices (constant 1987 local) 
GNP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers plus any 
taxes (less subsidies) that are not included in the valuation of output plus 
net receipts of primary income (employee compensation and property 
44 Long-term Economic and Military Trends 1994-2015, The Rand Corporation (1995), xii. 
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income) from nonresident sources. Data are in constant 1987 local 
currency.45 
Gross domestic investment (constant 1987 local) 
Gross domestic investment consists of outlays on additions to the fixed 
assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed 
assets cover land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, 
railways, and the like, including commercial and industrial buildings, 
offices, schools, hospitals, and private residential buildings. Data are 
expressed in constant 1987 local currency.46 
This exercise will use autoregressive-distributed lag (ARDL) and error correction 
modeling (ECM) to enable the identification of the relationship between GNP and gross 
domestic investment (GDI). This process determines the long run relationship between 
the dependant variable (GNP) and the independent variable (ODI). 
The ECM indicates the trends developed as the dependant variable follows 
fluctuations in the independent variable. The ECM also. rejects inaccuracies associated 
with spurious regressions (problems caused by the variables that. have correctional 
relationships over the long run by coincidence. The analysis was performed for the 
period 1975 to 1995. The results are listed in Table 4. 
The error correction term (ecm-l) signifies that a long-run relationship is 
significant between GNP and GDI. The negative value of the error correction term is 
significant in that it signifies that GNP will tend to follow ODI. That is that if investment 
falls in the PRC economic system, GNP will also decline. In addition, if investment 
rises, then GNP will also rise. The government can control investment to keep the 
45 World Bank, World Tables 1997, CD ROM edition (1997). 
46 Ibid. 
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economy within reasonable growth rates, this is an important quality that will facilitate 
more accurate forecasting. 47 
Table 4. Error Correction Representation of ARDL. PRC 






dINTPT -1. 13E=1O 
Ecm (-1) -.26 
List of additional temporary variables created: 
dGNP = GNP-GNP(-I) 
dGNPI = GNP (-I)-GNP (-2) 
dGNP2 = GNP (-2)-GNP (-3) 
dGNP3 = GNP (-3)-GNP (-4) 
dGDI = GDI-GDI (-1) 
dINTPT = INTPT -INTPT (-1) 
















Source: Data from World Bank World Tables, analysis performed using Microfit4.0 
(Windows version) by Pesaran & Persaran. 
To forecast GNP changes in future years, three values of predicted investment 
were entered into the Microfit4.0 ARDL model and run for the GNP, GDI regression 
performed above. This produces three future forecasts that will be used in the next 
chapter to develop a high growth scenario, a low growth scenario and a third mid-level 
growth scenario. Three sets of values were used for future investment: 
1. An average percentage increase of GDI for the last 20 years (11.2 
percent), for the high growth scenario. 
47 Robert Looney, "Defense Expenditures and Macroeconomic Stabilization in Pakistan: A test of the 
Military Keynesianism Hypothesis," Rivista Intrnazionale di Scienze economiche ecommercialli, 
forthcoming 1998. 
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2. A value for investments that keep GDI at a percentage of GNP at the 
low limits for the last 20 years (GDI = 32.52 percent of GDP in 1981). 
This will produce the low growth scenario. 
3. A value for investment that is in between the high and low values. 
Chart 3 depicts forecasted growth for the three scenarios. The forecast is 
presented in tabular form in the Appendix. The data file used with the ARDL model is 
also in the Appendix. 
Chart 3. Forecast ofPRC GNP 
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VI. SCENARIOS FOR CHINA'S FUTURE 
This exercise to forecast future growth in the PRC will consist of three major 
sections. The first section will identify elements critical to the future of the PRC 
economy that exist within the PRe. These domestic elements include economic and 
political factors that have an impact on the GNP growth. In the second section, issues 
will be identified and discussed that exist external to the PRC system. How ,China 
continues its integra~on into the world market, and the condition of that marketplace, will 
have a critical impact on the PRC's future. Finally, the third section of this chapter will 
develop three different scenarios of economic growth for the next decade in the PRC. 
Several different .combinations of the identified variables will be mixed and various 
possibilities tabulated. It is important to distinguish between elements that are external to 
the PRC economic system and those that are contained within the system. Thlis, ~e 
potential scenarios include combinations of good and poor, external and internal 
elements. An economic forecasting exercise by no means pretends to be an exact 
indicator of the future of an economic system, and a forecasting effort to quantify the 
future of the PRC economy specifically, in inherently on the inaccurate side of the entire 
economic forecasting accuracy spectrum. The PRC system is unlike any other economy 
in the world and therefore makes any kind of comparison difficult. 
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A. DOMESTIC ELEMENTS OF THE PRC ECONOMIC FUTURE 
In order to forecast future trends in the PRC economy key factors that have 
contributed to growth, and will contribute in the future, combine with new elements that 
have the potential to impact growth will provide an outline for the growth scenarios. 
1. . Human Capital 
Along with its transition from a planned economy to a market economy, the PRC 
is transitioning from an agrarian society into an industrial society; the way that the PRC 
system utilizes its workforce in this shift is critical to future growth. Throughout the 
reform period, a great source of China's productivity increase has been the development 
of human capital resources. Like other East Asian states, China enjoys the benefits of a 
relatively highly educated workforce. As the OECD recognizes: 
China's human resources were always well ahead of most countries', with 
a comparable level of per capita income. .. Confucian values among other 
influences had created an elite of highly educated people long before the 
communists came to power in 1949. Also like other East Asian states, 
China began a rapid expansion of its educational system at all levels in the 
1950s, and rewarded this effort after 1978.48 
China's brain trust can potentially take advantage of the hundreds of thousands of 
scholars sent abroad to study at the best schools that the world has to offer. An issue that 
will determine the effectiveness of this resource is the number of students that return to 
the PRC after receiving their degrees. As of 1995, more than 90 percent of the scholars 
receiving degrees in Europe and the US remained in those countries. The OECD, while 
noting this statistic, recognizes that this is not a 'brain drain' unique to the PRC, and is 
potentially only a temporary problem. "But over 90 percent of the students Korea and 
48 0EeD, China in the 21st Century Long-term Global Implications, 24. 
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Chinese Taipei sent abroad also did not return during the first two decades when these 
two economies began to grow rapidly." This is similar to the situation in the PRe. Then 
as the economies of the student's home countries developed and held better opportunities~ 
things changed. "However, by the 1970s many students from Korea and Chinese Taipei 
were going home and by the 1980s, most were returning, often after working for years in 
places like Silicon Valley.,,49 
The PRC's population poses challenges concerning future growth. Regional 
disparities in unemployment, technical expertise and developed infrastructure will have a 
critical affect on potential fractionalization. The World Bank notes that 35 to 40 percent 
of the agriculture workforce are still underemployed in the agrarian sector. "These 
workers could earn significantly more in nonagricultural activities." 50 Not only would 
these workers earn higher wages, they could contribute significantly to economic growth. 
China's population trends pose a significant problem for Chinese society. The 
country is experiencing a decrease in birth rates and will be reaching zero population 
growth in about 25 years.51 This radical shift in demography will soon produce a large 
percent of the population that is beyond the working age, who will be supported by a 
small number of workers. 
The issue of unemployment is difficult to analyze in the PRC system. There are 
actually a growing number of workers employed in the SOE sector. These enterprises 
49 Both quotations and the statistics provided in this paragraph taken from: OECD, China in the 21st 
Century Long-term Global Implications, 24. 
50 The World Bank, China 2020 Development Challenges in the new Century, (World Bank, 1997),45. 
51 Nicholas Eberstadt, "Demographic Clouds on China's Horizon," The American Enterprise; 
(Washington, JulfAug 1998),2. 
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employ a large part of the population and provide an effective social welfare system that 
has come to be known as the "Iron Rice Bowl." All SOE workers are technically counted 
as employed but large numbers of workers produce a decreasing proportion of the PRC's 
economic output, this appears very much like a socialist economy.52 As reforms of the 
SOEs continue, millions of workers will be added to the numbers of officially 
unemployed. The significance of the SOE sector and its influence on unemployment will 
be covered in the next section. 
2. State Owned Enterprises 
A study of China's SOEs highlights one of the core issues with market reforms in 
the Chinese Communist system. Before 1979, China's SOBs operated in a planned 
economy with very little freedom of decision making and almost no budget restraints 
from the state. Some characteristics of the SOEs reflect common criticisms often aimed 
at socialist systems. As stated in the previous section, the SOE sector account~ for a 
continually shrinking percentage of the PRC gross domestic product (GDP) compared to 
the non-state sector, while at the same time, it employing a disproportionate amount of 
rural labor. 53 In addition, the SOEs absorb almost two-thirds of the available bank credit. 
These figures signify substantial inefficiencies in the SOEs. Lack of local control 
reduces management flexibility and induces inefficiency. Lack of local control also 
reduces worker motivation. 
52 Martin Wolfe, "Asian Crisis: China's Temptation" Online. Available 
http://web.nps.navy.miI/-reiooney/3041_434.htm. 5 August 1998. 
53 IMF, "China - Growth and Economic reforms," Wor{d Report 1997, (IMF 1997), 125. 
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The SOB sector was a source of reform in all four periods. This indicates that 
state leaders recognized the inherent inefficiency of the SOBs, but because of ingrained 
ideology, the leaders resisted change, and reform measures showed no effectiveness. 
Beginning in 1979, SOB managers were right to make decisions incrementally. At first 
they were allowed to make decisions about bonuses, how, and what to produce. Soon 
managers made pricing, marketing, and investment decisions. 
The method of reform in this area is to implement new practices in a small 
number of SOBs experimentally, then if successful, expanded to other SOBs. In the 
period of expansion, other reforms were implemented and expanded. Thus, at anyone 
time there are several reforms being implemented simultaneously. 54 Thus far, the most 
significant reforms were those noted in Phase IT providing increased autonomy for each 
enterprise and the management within. One reform that was not even considered until 
only recently is a change of ownership that would constitute a move towards 
privatization. Again, the socialist tradition hinders a move to a market economy. 
The OBeD identifies two reasons that reform in the SOB area has come slowly. 
First, because these enterprises employ such a large n\lffiber of workers (SOB 
employment numbers are higher now than they were when reforms were initiated in 
1978). Not only do the SOBs employ the workers; they also constitute a sort of a social 
service net by providing housing and healthcare. A decrease in the SOBs could result 
directly in a huge number of unemployed and homeless people, which could put an 
incapacitating burden on society. Secondly, reforms would take political power away 
54 Sachs and Woo, "Understanding China's Economic Performance," 17. 
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from the governmental elite that regulates the SOEs. The bureaucracy is simply reluctant 
to relinquish power. "Local governments and even the Ministry of Finance depend on 
the enterprises for revenue, including revenues over and above those required by the 
formal tax system.,,55 
OEeD analysis sees three potential futures for PRC SOEs. The first is an 
ossification of the SOE bureaucracy, freezing reforms in their current state as a crippling 
combination of inefficiency and social support. A second progression, which could 
develop, is a complete release of the SOEs by the state. The enterprises would be forced 
to sink or swim on their own merits.56 The third and most likely scenario for SOEs is that 
the enterprises be consolidated into large, quasi-state controlled conglomerates. This 
process is currently underway and the enterprises are starting to appear more similar to 
the South Korean Chaebols than the Western style corporations that US economists had 
hoped. This is an example of the Asian metaphor that the economies of Asia were "a 
flock of geese." The countries were all at different stages of development following the 
"lead goose," the Japanese economy. The PRC economy could represent a very big and 
slow goose that is just now catching up with the pack. One potential problem with this 
idea is that the Chinese could follow the Asian path to a fate similar to the other 
"tigers.,,57 The OECD does see a positive solution: 
The way out of this dilemma is for China to abandon hope of creating a 
Japanese!Korean-style system and to move toward an industrialization 
programme based mainly on market forces. Large parts of the licensing 
55 OEeD, China in the 21st Century Long-term Global Implications, 25. 
56 Ibid., 25. 
57 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1997), 177. 
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and control apparatus would have to be dismantled. Land and capital 
could be allocated at market-determined prices. International trade would 
have to be liberalised much further, perhaps through China's joining the 
World Trade Organization and abiding by its rules except for limited 
infant industry protection. 58 
The ramifications, whatever reforms occur, will have a large impact on the future of 
the PRe economy. The SOEs may continue to drag the economy into decreasing growth 
or they could represent another source of improved productivity. 
3. Industrial and Manufacturing Sectors 
The PRC industrial sector has gained from the labor movement of the agricultural 
sector because of Deng's reforms. This area is a major source of the productivity 
increases highlighted by Hu and Kahn. For the PRC to maintain growth, the industrial 
sector must maintain efficiency. Growing inventories in many industrial sectors are an 
indicator of a decrease in efficiency of the system and a mentality of production for 
production's sake. 59 
The PRC is trying to become a world economic power in much the same way that 
its neighboring countries have the progression through low-tech, labor intensive sectors 
to higher profit manufacturing benefiting from higher level of education and training. 
The OECD states: 
China has an enormous reservoir of labour with a very low opportunity 
cost, and a functioning market economy should support both an 
economically efficient use of relatively abundant resources and a pattern 
of new investment and technological change which also reflects relative 
factor availability. 60 
580ECD, China in the 21't Century Long-term Global Implications, 25. 
59 Nicholas Lardy, "China and the Asian contagion," Foreign Affairs, New York, Jul/Aug 1998,7. 
6°OECD, China in the 21st Century Long-term Global Implications, 40. 
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If the PRC is able to transition to areas of production in higher value added industries, 
GNP will continue to grow. , 
4. Agriculture Sector 
The importance of the agricultural sector lies in two different issues, first there is 
the need'to produce enough to feed a huge population. Second, to improve efficiency of 
labor, resource and environmental impact. The World Bank recognizes that the 
agriculture industry was able to produce at a level to sufficiently feed the PRC population 
because of the introduction of the household responsibility system, but that growth is 
slowing because of five constraints to domestic production: 61 
1. Reforms in the market for food grains 
2. Institutional change in the market for fertilizer 
3. Investment in agricultural research 
4. Investment in irrigation 
5. Land reclamation and development 
The system is showing signs of growing pains; trying to keep up with a growing 
population and an increasing demand to urbanize arable land. PRC intervention with the 
world agricultural market plays an important role in the future and will be covered in 
later sections. 
5. Infrastructure Strains 
China does not have the infrastructure of a well-developed country.62 Bottlenecks 
and inefficiencies in areas that include the production and distribution of food and energy 
keep the PRC economy from achieving higher rates of growth, where if efficiently 
handled, these could be sources of increased productivity to bolster stronger and longer 
61 China 2020, 62. 
62 World Bank, Country Study. 
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lasting growth. These weaknesses are in part the result of decades of under investment in 
the transportation sector. Infrastructure strain severity differs regionally, the World Bank 
explains: "not least because of the importance attached to regional self-sufficiency during 
the pre-reform era. It must also be recognized that any economy would have had 
difficulties keeping up in terms of provision of transport infrastructure with the rapid 
overall rate of economic growth in the 1980s.,,63 
6. Financial and Service Sector Development 
China has benefited from large amounts of capital flowing into its economy. This 
has occurred in the form of FDI and foreign exchange availability from international 
trade. The amount of FDI in the PRC increased exponentially in the early 1990s to the 
current level of nearly $40 billion per year, making China the world's leading recipient of 
PDI. China's large, low cost, relatively high skill work force attracts FDI from m'any 
countries, the top three of which are Taiwan, Japan and the US. Until the PRC take over 
of Hong Kong in 1997, Hong Kong was the number one source of PDI in China. That 
money is now considered internal investments. Taiwan's FDI is an odd connection 
binding the interests of two potentially hostile governments. Most FDI in China is in low 
end manufacturing, much of which is simple assembly, and re-export plants. Although, 
recent investment trends have been in more advanced sectors such as automobiles, 
electronics, and aerospace. This is a move to establish a high-tech foothold for increased 
future profits.64 Specific sources of FDI and China's foreign exchange will be covered 
later, in the external factor section. 
63 Ibid., xix. 
64Greg Mastel, The Rise of the Chinese Economy, The Middle Kingdom Emerges, 9. 
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Domestic investment is a pillar of the policy used by PRC leaders to control the 
macroeconomic cycles that the economy experiences. The future of GDI will be an 
indication of the economic policy direction that the PRC is taking. Economic policy 
makers tie GNP growth figures directly to unemployment levels and are striving to 
maintain better than eight percent growth to prevent large numbers of unemployed 
workers from dragging down the economy. Domestic investment levels seem to be the 
avenue that is used to stimulate growth levels. This method seems to be working, as 
large increases in investment on infrastructure in the first three quarters of 1998 is 
starting to show result in the form of higher GNP growth.65 
In the command economy of the pre-reform period, a public service sector was 
considered parasitic as the governmental structure employed workers to conduct all 
services. Now that there is a growing non-state sector and the SOEs are generating ever-
decreasing amounts of tax revenues, there are potential gains in this important area. In 
theory, as the system moves towards marketization the need for a service sector will 
create a vacuum, which will be filled with persons who will establish the required 
services; this will be kept efficient by market competition. In 1993, China's share of 
employment in services was at 21.2 percent. This is quite low when compared to that of 
the Republic of Korea (47.7), or the average OECD country (between 65 and 70 
percent).66 If the economy continues to grow; this is an area of potential increased 
productivity. 
65 Craig S. Smith, "Chinese Economy Picks Up On State Spending,." The Wall Street Journal, 19 
October 1998, C17. 
66 OECD, China in the 21st Century Long-term Global Implications, 28. 
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One service area in which China needs to expand is the financial sector. Reforms 
are underway, the state commercialized state banks by lowering decision-making levels 
concerning lending decisions. A potential problem is in the area of non-performing loans 
to float the SOEs. Governmental authorities designated 1997 as the year to strengthen 
accounting and loan standards, to try to quantify and optimize the situation in the banking 
system. 67 
7. Political Stability and Government Policy 
The stresses and strains involved with an economy that has experienced 20 years 
of high growth confined within the physical and social infrastructure such as in the PRC 
system are immense. Volumes of writings have been dedicated to outlining the many 
possible directions a changing CCP will go in the face of the many possible situations. 
Will the government revert to the authoritarian system of the pre-reform period? Will the 
penetration of the world market drive the PRC to democracy? The answer is probably 
somewhere between these two extremes. The OECD recognizes that speculation 
concerning this issue is beyond the level of that organization's economists.68 It is 
therefore beyond the level of this paper. This paper will utilize the OECD's prediction 
concerning consequences of social change in the PRe. 
If there is a serious political disorder, it will feed back on economic policy and 
performance in ways that will keep economic growth low. Alternatively, if there is 
political stability as well as sensible economic policies, economic growth is likely to be 
rapid, which will in turn, contribute to continued political stability. Economic growth 
67 IMP "China Growth and Economic reforms" 125. 
68 OECD, China in the 21st Century Long-term Global Implications. 
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alone may not be capable of dampening the tensions that could upset the political system, 
but it is hard to imagine how these tensions can be kept under control in the absence of 
sustained economic growth. 69 
B. GROWTH ISSUES EXTERNAL TO THE PRC SYSTEM 
From an international perspective, three important factors rest on the PRC's 
relations with the world outside of "the Middle Kingdom," opportunities to export 
manufactured goods, foreign direct investment and a proper place in the world order. 
1. Integration with the World Economy 
By virtue of its sheer size, China is a major exporter in the world economy and 
under each of the growth scenarios, the PRC will become the world's second largest 
economy some time in the first decade of the 21 st century.70 Additionally, if the PRC is 
to attain the goal of achieving a decent level of living' for its large population, it must 
continue to expand exports. This could have a drastic effect on the international market, 
which then would displace other exporters to make room for exports from the PRC. 
China's foreign exchange availability benefits greatly from the large amounts of 
FDI received because of the PRCs booming export section. In 1972, PRC exports were 
at about the $2 billion level. The Deng reforms enabled China to become a major 
exporter reaching $150 billion in 1995.71 This amounts to an annual increase of 17 
percent. The PRC benefits from its large FDI because it represents long term investment 
• 69 Ibid., 30. 
70 Marcus Noland, "China and the International Economic System," Institute for International 
Economics, working paper 95-6, Online Available http://web.nps.navy.mill-relooney/3040_476.htm. 5 
November 1998, 1. 
71 OECD, China in the 2J'f Century Long-term Global Implications, 22. 
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and keeps the system from falling victim to the liquidity problems associated with the 
Asian economic crisis (more on that later). A potential problem with a dependency on 
growing trade is the need to keep the high levels of growth. There are questions 
concerning whether or not the world economy can satisfy such growth from one country. 
2. The Asian Economic Crisis 
Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs of the Harvard Institute for International 
Development conducted a thorough review of the Asian financial crisis while writing for 
the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity in early 1998. Radelet and Sachs concluded 
that the crisis was caused by proper intentions paired with incorrect actions, which were 
worsened by panic. The problems began as the markets of Indonesia, Korea and 
Thailand, all in positions of partially implemented banking reforms, made loans that 
would become unserviceable. This caused a liquidity problem and made the fragile 
systems extremely vulnerable to reverses of capital flows. Once it was obvious that the 
countries were carrying short-term deficits, inappropriate actions, some by the IMP, 
contributed to an unnecessary panic. As Radelet and Sachs write: "At a later stage, the 
IMP's exclusive focus on 'fixing' Asia, without proper regard to the root problems of 
international financial market instability, imposed excessive costs on the East Asian 
economies." 72 
The East Asian countries were making an effort to reform their banking sector in 
a move away from authoritarian control to a more efficient market system. This made the 
weak link in the financing system of East Asia the inexperienced lending practices which 
72 Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, ''The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, 
Prospects," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, (1: 1998),4. 
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were trying to take advantage of high growth markets.' The problem was that the 
borrowers, also caught up in the high growth, were financing unproductive operations. 
Radlet and Sachs' outline of the crisis is rather long but worth quoting whole. 
We point out that as the East Asian economies continued to achieve rapid 
economic growth in the 1990s, there were growing imbalances and 
weaknesses at both the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. Most 
important, there was a rapid buildup of short-term external debt into weak 
financial systems - made possible both because East Asia's successful 
track record attracted foreign credits, and because partial financial market 
liberalization in the region opened new channels for the entry of foreign 
capital. The inflows led to appreciating real exchange rates, to a rapid 
expansion of bank lending, and in particular, to increasing vulnerability to 
a reversal in capital flows. When capital flows did wane in late 1996 and 
early 1997, a series of missteps by Asian governments, market 
participants, the IMF and the international community resulted in a 
financial panic. The crisis was much deeper than was either necessary or 
inevitable. 73 
As of September of 1998, China has shown few symptoms of the crisis; several 
explanations account for this. The problem with the lack of transparency in the PRC 
system again makes economic data somewhat questionable, and this case is no different. 
All information presented here comes from Western economists who, naturally, view the 
world with a Western bias. Ironically, China's immunity to the Asian crisis stems 
partially from what westerners identified as a system weakness, bank reform. China has 
not taken off all of the restraints on central bank lending. This produced much less 
inflow of short-term capital in the early 1990s and therefore the PRC markets were not 
susceptible to the instability of the markets of the rest of Asia. China did not need the 
short-term capital that other markets required because of the huge amounts of FDI 
73 Ibid., 22. 
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discussed earlier in this paper. One of the benefits of FDI is that it tends to be long term 
in nature, preventing liquidity problems. 
Problems that the PRC system has encountered are because of participation in a 
global and regional marketplace that is experiencing a slowdown. As the markets with 
which China does business have less purchasing power, the PRC can export less. This 
leads to a slowdown in income and economic growth. 
Other external conditions may have an effect on China's future; one area is 
international pressure for the PRC to deal with internal issues that include the following: 
human rights, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear testing, high-tech weapons sales, and 
predatory trade practices. This area also includes international military conflict. 
C. SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE PRC ECONOMY 
Figure I below provides a matrix, which illustrates the relationship between 
external market factors and internal conditions, combing to determine the PRCs ~uture. 
The vertical axis presents external market factors from a low level of near worldwide 
recession at the origin to the optimistic level of truly free markets at the top of box 1. 
The horizontal axis presents the range of internal conditions and extends from an unstable 
government that is in the near collapse condition similar to that currently in Russia, at the 
origin, to a open governmental system of economic and political freedoms and effective 
reforms. The vertical axis represents the world around the PRC. The continuum for this 
category is from world economic depression to a thriving world economy, that of low 
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From Figure 1, three scenarios will be discussed. Scenario 1 is the high growth 
alternative (box 3). Scenario 2 is the middle scenario of boxes 2,5 and 6. Finally, 
scenario 3 is the low growth collapse model of box 7. Boxes 1,4,8 and 9 have not been 
included in scenario development because of the low likelihood of the extreme levels of 
the defining variables. 
1. SCENARIO 1. Continued High Growth (11 percent) 
This sC{fnario has China growing at the same level as the last 20 years or higher. 
For this to be a realistic situation, nearly every factor needs to go right for China. The 
external factors are more straightforward to conceive than the internal.' World markets 
must remain open and able to deal with China's growing level of power and exports. 
Increased foreign exchange and FDI would enable the country to take advantage of all 
listed opportunities and remove or avoid any potential barriers. In addition, the external 
environment must include a lack of any type of military conflict that would dampen 
international trade or force the PRC to spend resources on defense/annament that could 
be spent on infrastructure. 
The internal requirements for economic growth are more complex. China must 
maintain its high savings and investment rates while building infrastructure and a social 
net to reduce potential dissatisfaction with unemployment and homelessness. All reforms 
identified in Phase III must be carried out, but care must be taken in banking reforms to 
ensure that problems do not arise similar to other East Asian countries. 
A difficult transition will be the SOE sector. As discussed earlier, reforms in this 
area will reduce both the taxes received by the state and the bureaucratic power of the 
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elite. Corruption at all levels must be minimized as there is potential for a shift from the 
SOEs to a form of "crony capitalism." 
Reform of the financial structure and continued growth may cause inflationary 
pressures that would require sound macroeconomic policy. The OECD asserts that if 
many of the optimum situations develop the momentum of the growth would likely 
dampen other potential problems. A table for the sequence of events in the high growth 
scenario is presented as Table 5. 
2. SCENARIO 2. Mid-level Growth (7.5 percent) 
This scenario groups box 2,5 and 6 from Figure 1, because they are possibilities if 
cascading events degrade either the external or internal issues. This section will be 
broken down into two situations, a deteriorating external environment and a "triumph of 
the bureaucracy," as a deterioration of the internal system could be described. 
A deteriorating external environment could come about in several ways, although 
judging from the way that the PRC has weathered the recent round of crisis, external 
problems would likely be triggered from within. China's continued growth may strain 
the world market system to a point where some event will trigger deterioration. This 
could be in the form of a perceived predatory move on the part of the PRC (like 
devaluation of currency or increased tariffs). Problems could even arise if the trade 
surplus between China and the US continues to be an issue. 
International problems may effect the levels of trade between the PRC and the 
rest of the world. China must keep trade growing in order to avoid problems from an 
ever-increasing population. Market reforms would stop at their present levels and the 
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satisfaction level of the populace would fall. Just as strorig positive factors would push 
the situation up and right on the matrix, problems would pull the Chinese economy down 
and to the left. However, it is unlikely that the situation would drop into the level of box 
7. As the OECD writes: "Barring an outright collapse of the political system, however, 
growth in the economy will not come to a halt. During the two decades that contained 
the disastrous economic policies of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution 
(1957-78), China still managed an average GNP growth rate of 4.5 percent per year.,,74 
Even if the external environment remains open, the inefficiencies of the PRC 
bureaucracy could consume any potential for growth. The current government system is 
clearly reluctant to relinquish the power that it now holds. This situation could be 
characterized by the PRC following the example of the other Asian tigers and letting 
SOEs develop into Chaebol type conglomerates, following the other inefficient Asian 
economies into financial recession. Corruption would become a burden and increase 
inefficiencies. 
3. SCENARIO 3. Low-level Growth (4 percent). 
This is the worst of the worst cases and highly unlikely. The result of a major 
international crisis or bout of worldwide recession may caUse both interior and exterior 
factors to deteriorate and the PRC system would revert back to a point of high 
unemployment among an exploding population, the infrastructure would crumble. 
Monetary problems would be exacerbated by hyperinflation and the current system 
would collapse to a barter type economy with virtually nowhere for reforms to start. At 
74 Ibid., 33. 
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this point, the PRC would resemble the present state of the economy in Russia although 
the two countries would have taken different roads from a Leninist economy, to a market 
economy, to collapse. A table diagram for the sequence of events in the low growth 
scenario is presented as Table 6. 
Table 5. High Growth Scenario 
Initial Conditions (1998) Epoch 1. (2005) Epoch 2. (2010) 
Scholars educated overseas Scholars educated overseas International marketplace 
return absorbs PRC 
Low investment in research Savings rates rise Domestic consumer market 
and technology, stagnant grows, inventories diminish 
workforce education level 
High savings rates PRC integrates into world Corruption decreases 
market (includes PLA) 
Banks need reform Bank reforms Exports increase 
Rural to urban migration SOEs reformed, efficient Efficient investment in 
restricted enterprises, lower infrastructure, food and 
unemployment energy distribution 
Small public service sector Bad debt decreases Industrial/manufacturing 
modernizes and transitions 
to high value added 
])roducts 
Economic crisis in Asia Public service sector FDI increases causing high-
expands end manufacturing to 
expand 
Political stability Aging Population does not 
burden society 
Asian economic crisis does 
not spread to PRC 
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Table 6. Low Growth Scenario 
Initial Conditions (1998) Epoch 1. (2005) Epoch 2. (2010) 
Scholars educated overseas Scholars educated overseas International marketplace do not return becomes hostile 
Low investment in research Savings rates drop Domestic consumer market 
and technology, stagnant shrinks, inventories build 
workforce education level 
High savings rates PRC cannot integrates into Corruption increases 
world market (includes PLA) 
Banks need reform Bank reforms never happen Exports decrease 
Rural to urban migration SOEs not reformed, No investment in 
restricted inefficiencies absorb infrastructure, food and 
capital, unemployment rises energy distribution fails 
Small public service sector Bad debt accumulates Industrial/manufacturing 
does not modernize stays 
with low value added 
products 
Economic crisis in Asia Public service sector never FDI decreases high-end 
expands manufacturing never 
expands 
Political instability Aging Population burdens 
society 
Asian economic crisis 'PRC devaluation triggers 
spreads globally more regional devaluation 
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VII. PRC POLICY, US POLICY AND THE WORLD 
Sino-US relations currently focus on economic policy as an avenue to shape 
political policy. This chapter addresses three areas where further research is needed to 
fully determine the correct policy that the US should assume. These areas are: 
1. Is it possible to affect PRC policy toward a direction that aligns 
with US interests? 
2. Is the PRC system moving in a direction of democratization? 
3. Can US policy affect a PRC move toward democratization? 
Each of these questions is an analysis of a complicated relationship between the US and a 
complicated PRC system. 
The focus of this thesis is the PRC economy and the possibility of sustaining the 
growth recognized as a result of the 'post 1978 reforms. A short survey of PRC and'US 
foreign policies is important in order to identify areas that require future research. An 
analysis of foreign relations between the PRC and the US illuminates a situation that is 
just as complicated and difficult to understand as the PRC system itself. The PRC and 
US are locked into a relationship that is a mix of conflict and interdependence. Each 
country needs the other in order to continue to increase its standards of living. Potential 
policy options for each nation span the range of orientations from friendly to hostile. The 
optimists in each country see the other as a necessary ally in the movement toward a true 
world economy while the more pessimistic and militaristic see the other country as a 
threat from a regional and global standpoint. 
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A. POLICY OPTIONS 
Relations between the PRC and the US seem to have a cyclical nature, oscillating 
between hostility and cooperation. In times of strained relations perceived Chinese 
misbehaviors such as human rights violations, military technology and arms proliferation 
and unfair trade practices are met with US actions such as removal of most favored 
nation status (MFN) and strong talk of containment. 
The US policy possibilities toward the PRC cover the continuum from passive to 
aggressive approaches. David Shambaugh outlines three possible directions for USIPRC 
relations: engagement, confrontation and destabilization.75 Denny Roy describes three 
potential orientations as appeasement, enmeshment and containment.76 A combination of 
these two lists produces a list that separates the spectrum into four categories, 
appeasement, enmeshment/engagement, confrontation/containment, and destabilization. 
Each stance is promoted by politicians and special interest groups who cast their political, 
economic or military lots with the idea that US policy will shape a particular future for 
the PRe. These orientations do have one thing in common; all involve some level of US 
interaction in shaping a changing PRe. This is important because no matter what 
viewpoint one assumes concerning Sino-US relations, there is no debate concerning the 
fact that China is at a very important and dynamic point in its history. Each viewpoint 
does differ in the direction they believe these changes will steer relations between these 
two countries. 
75 David Shambaugh, "The United States and China: A New Cold War?", Current History, Vol. 94, 
No. 593, September 1995,243. 
76 Denny Roy, "The 'China Threat' Issue, Major Arguments", Asian Survey, August 1996, 765. 
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On the most radical side of the spectrum is appeasement. The idea behind this 
position is that the PRC is growing, and it is going to become a regional and world giant. 
Any efforts to influence the PRC system will only anger its policy makers and will have 
no positive results. This outlook is more pessimistic than engagement or enmeshment 
concerning the ability of outside forces to shape the PRC system. Appeasement 
advocates believe that the PRC system will better develop in a direction aligning with US 
interests without the added aggravation of US influence. 
Analysts that view the PRC system with the most suspicion are advocates of a 
confrontational or containment type relationship. This group perceives Chinese business 
and· political leaders as hostile to the US. They fear that as an economic giant, the PRC 
would treat the world in the same authoritarian style that they treat Chinese citizens. 
Therefore, the proper way to interact with such a country would be a strong policy of 
containment in all issues important to American interests. 
On the side of the policy spectrum that believes in high levels of intervention are 
the advocates of destabilization who identify Chinese Communists specifically as the 
threat to the US, and believe a policy fo foster political change would align post 
Communist China with American interests. This orientation has the smallest number of 
proponents of the four, but bears mentioning for the purposes of identifying the entire 
range of options. 
B. CURRENT US POLICY RELATIONS WITH THE PRC 
The Clinton administration adopted a policy of engagement mid way through its 
first term. In a 1995 article, Shambaugh asserted that US policy was taking the direction 
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of "comprehensive engagement." This, he stated, was separating all issues concerning 
USIPRC relations and dealing with them individually. At that time, Shambaugh 
considered total PRC collapse a possibility. Therefore, this policy would not be viewed 
by the PRC as too containing. An impression of containment, Shambaugh asserted, 
would reduce US leverage in the case of a PRC fragmentation, contributing to a total 
collapse with devastating consequences to regional stability and world economic 
markets. 77 Marcus Noland identified difficulties concerning PRC perceptions of US 
inconsistencies that he attributed to the nature of the US political system. 
US policy toward China is probably best regarded as a manifestation of 
competing interests in whic,h no single goal predominates and special 
interest groups may hold sway on particular issues. This sometimes gives 
the impression of an inconsistent policy, but to a certain extent this is 
probably inherent in the structure of the US political system and the lack 
of domestic consensus over goals, strategies and tactics in the post-Cold 
War world.78 , . 
Currently, most US policy makers favor an "active engagement" strategy for 
Sino-US relations into the 21 st century.79 At this point, it makes sense to have a policy 
that tries to work with the PRC to help that system develop in a manner consistent with 
US interests. In a June 1998 interview, President Clinton recognized that it was in the 
best interests of the US to foster a PRC system that "embraces political pluralism" and 
integrates smoothly into the world market. The President expressed fear that a 
containment policy would force the PRe to look inward to its domestic market in order to 
77 David Shambaugh, "The United States and China: ANew Cold War?" 243. 
78 Marcus Noland, "China and the International Economic System" 
79 China's Economic Future, Challenges to U.S. Policy, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the 
United States, ed. (Armonk, M.E. Sharpe: 1997), xvi. 
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sustain strong economic growth. This would be counterproductive to US economic and 
foreign policy interests.8o If, in the future, there are indications that the PRC system is 
evolving in a direction hostile to US interests, it would still be possible to harden US 
policy. It currently appears likely that the PRC will develop in a direction more friendly 
to the US than belligerent. Chinese President Jiang Zemin expressed feelings that Sino-
US relations were progressing well: "During my visit to the United States last year, 
President Clinton and I decided that China and the United States should work together 
toward a constructive strategic partnership. Since then, China-US relations have 
constantly improved.,,81 Furthermore, whether it is even possible to affect PRC policy in 
a direction that aligns with US interests needs further study. 
Two methods in which US policy can affect the PRC system are bilaterally and 
multilaterally. An example of a bilateral method of influencing the PRC is through the 
granting of most favored nation status (MFN). This issue has come to symbolize th~ 
debate concerning PRC-US relations. Originally given to every country with which the 
US conducted trade, the failure to grant MFN status became an issue in the early Cold 
War era when the US was attempting to inhibit the spread of Communism. The term 
"most favored" does not mean that a country is all that special, as there are only six 
countries that do not enjoy MFN status. 
The arguments against granting China MFN status appear to be an attack on the 
President as much as the policy. From a purely legal standpoint, enforcement of the 
Jackson-Vanik trade act of 1974 requires the President to get a waiver of MFN status if a 
80 Bill Clinton, "Why I'm Going to Beijing," Newsweek, 29 June 1998, 28. 
81 Jiang Zemin, interviewed by Lally Weymouth, NewstVeek, 29 June 1998,26. 
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country limits immigration. The President must get MFN approval from a partisan 
legislative branch, the issue becomes a battle of politics, and the actual issue of the PRC 
economy becomes secondary. Clinton opponents cite campaign finance issues and 
technology transfer as inappropriate ties with the country and wish to use the act of 1974 
to limit the President's agenda. Big labor (ironically a strong traditional Democratic 
supporter) notes the loss of US jobs caused by the large trade deficit with the PRe. 
Human rights and environmental groups identify China's abuses in both areas as reasons 
not to have any relations, either political or economic. The most valid issues are actually 
China's protectionist nature and non-reciprocation of comparatively low US tariff levels. 
To justify MFN approval the Administration highlights PRC moves that 
demonstrate a softening of the regime's policies. These include: 
1. China's condemnation of the recent nuclear testing by Pakistan and 
India. 
2. The PRC's assumption of a leadership role concerning 
proliferation issues in the South Asia region (China hosting a P-5 
meeting to discuss regional security issues exemplifies this). 
3. China's reaction to the Asian financial crisis (stable currency 
values) in bolstering regional economic stability. 
4. The constructive PRC role in Korean peace talks. 
5. Renewed contact with Taiwan. 82 
While MFN status is a bilateral issue strictly between the US and the PRC, the US 
does have avenues to affect the way in which the PRC integrates into global economic 
institutions (multilaterally). An example of this is the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The WTO is comprised of the major trading nations separated into developed countries 
and developing countries. To be a member of the WTO a country must meet the basic 
82 United States Information Service, Washington File, White House Fact Sheet on China MFN 
Renewal, June 03, 1998. 
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requirements of membership: "transparency of the trade regime; uniform, non-
discriminatory application of trade rules; and national treatment for goods and, to a more 
limited extent, service providers.,,83 China has yet to be allowed membership because of 
lack of transparency in trade restrictions and differing policies in different regions of the 
country. Marcus Noland identifies odd discrepancies in PRC attitudes toward 
international criticism: "Ironically, the US insistence on market access (which is, after all, 
trade expanding and welfare-enhancing) has been criticized in China, while the EU's 
demands for safeguards (which restrict trade and reduce welfare) has received less 
opprobrium.,,84 Another point of contention is what designation the PRC would receive if 
it were to join the WTO. Naturally, PRC technocrats wish to enter the organization as a 
developing nation, the designation that bestows the most concessions. 
On the down side of using the WTO in order to gain leverage in shaping the PRC 
economy, the US runs the risk of alienating the Chinese. These efforts could be 
perceived as overly containing and serve to anger PRC policymakers, pushing them into a 
more predatory position. Recent trends in PRC policy show a shift to a more inward 
orientated stance; it is even proposed that the PRC no longer desires to be a member of 
the WTO.85 
C. PRC VIEWS OF THE US 
Just as the US has policy makers who tend to be either pro-PRC or anti-PRC, the 
PRC has policy makers who are either soft on Sino-US relations or take the hard line. 
83 Marcus Noland, "China and the International Economic System," 8. 
84 Ibid., 8. 
85 Steven Haggard, Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California at San Diego 
in Asian Security Conference, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, November 5,1998. 
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The soft line leaders in the PRC believe that, for the near term, the US is a dominant 
power, so the preferred strategy in working with the US. is to allow minor concessions in 
order to ensure positive relations. On the other side are the hard liners who believe that 
the PRC is assuming a much too submissive position in relations between the two 
countries, and that PRC policy should shift to a more confrontational stance. Proponents 
of the hard line have been strengthened by a recent rise in anti-US sentiment in the 
An issue that clouds analysis concerning PRC policy is identifying the source of 
that policy. In the years since Deng's reforms a shift of de-facto power has occurred 
away from CCP leaders and toward business technocrats. Greg Austin writes: "The 
manifest inability of the Communist Party to overcome its chronic factionalism and the 
severe and widespread challenge to' its authority at the grass-roots level will probably 
deny the Party the levers of power that could quickly reverse current trends.,,87 It appears 
that the CCP is changing. This could be a change for the better in terms of alignment 
with US interests. The newer party leaders are younger, more educated, and tend to 
appreciate economic concerns more than traditional party ideals.88 Is this a move toward 
more democratization on the part of the PRC, or is it possible to have "a market economy 
with Chinese characteristics" that mixes communism with capitalism? This raises 
• 86 Ideas presented in NS 3661 course at Naval Postgraduate School, September 1, 1998, Professor 
Denny Roy. 
87 Greg Austin, "The Strategic Implications of China's Public Order Crisis" Survival, Vol. 37, No.2, 
Summer 1995, 13. 
88 Ibid. 
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another area that needs further study: is the PRC system moving in a direction of 
democratization and can US policy affect that move? 
It appears that the PRC desires to be an influential economic superpower in the 
region. Recent actions that indicate the PRC is making an effort to fit into the world 
economy include the rather benign method with which the PRC reacquired control over 
Hong Kong in 1997 and the contributions to the IMP that helped finance the bailout of 
Thailand. An additional indication of the direction in which PRC policy is evolving will 
come as talks progress concerning the PRCffaiwan issue. Taiwan offers substantial 
economic benefits to the PRC in the case of a friendly accord. Hostile military actions by 
the PRC on the island of Taiwan could destroy valuable infrastructure. Curbing Taiwan 
independence is, however a very important piece of PRC policy and the choice between 
letting Taiwan have independence and protecting economic potential will reveal much 
concerning the direction in which the PRC is going at this critical time. 
An issue that has not yet become contentious is the growing trade imbalance 
between the US and the PRe. Considering the diminished export opportunities that have 
resulted from the Asian economic crises, the PRC needs to in~rease imports to the US in 
order to maintain growth. Another impact of the crisis could be a reduction of prices of 
Asian goods imported into the US in the coming year. This would increase demand in 
the US while making US exports to the PRC more expensive and increase the current 
account deficit even more. 
Another area of question concerning China's intentions of becoming a great 
power is what kind of a power the PRC would be. As mentioned above, it appears that 
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the PRC desires a role in the economic world. What about international security? The 
PRC has long articulated a noticeably defensive stance concerning its numerically strong 
army and weapons that include intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), modern diesel 
submarines, and Russian built fighter aircraft. The PRC certainly possesses the military 
assets of a world power, but the capability to utilize and maintain those weapons is 
questionable. A National Security Planning Associates study concluded that the PRC's 
main interests were listed in the Summer of 1997 congress as: "continued economic 
growth, curbing Taiwan independence, and preserving domestic stability.,,89 This gives a 
strong indication that the PRC will be in the position to focus on internal issues for the 
next several decades. The same report summarized: "Indeed, there is now ample reason 
to believe that the second quarter of the twenty-first century will see China more as an 
economic giant than as the only remaining major communist dictatorship in the world.,,9o 
The sound macroeconomic policies demonstrated by PRC leadership for the past 
twenty years make a total economic collapse highly unlikely, and therefore the PRC 
should realize some level of growth through the first quarter of the 21 st century. This 
should prove true, even if the Asian economic crisis were to worsen. Economic growth 
seems to be the only consistent thinK in the PRC in the last twenty years. As the PRC 
economy grows it is destined to become the largest economy in the world. The question 
of how to deal with such an economic giant is much less certain. To help define a policy 
89 Asia-Pacific, Issues & Developments by National Security Planning Associates, a subsidiary of the 
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, MA, October, 31,1997,58. 
90 Ibid., 58. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to study the Chinese economy and analyze the 
economic growth that the country has experienced since Deng Xiaoping instituted 
reforms in 1978. The goal is to provide an answer to the question: is the economic 
growth of the current PRC system sustainable? Critical factors that contributed to that 
economic growth, along with recent trends and developments, hold valuable information 
concerning the potential for continued growth. A survey of existing literature 
concentrated on the factors that have the potential for continued contributions to 
economic growth. The goal of the review was to make some sense of the great quantities 
of literature that have proliferated of late. To this base, economic forecasting was added 
to provide insight concerning specifics for future scenarios. Forecasts from prominent 
China watchers were studied and an autoregressive-distributed lag model and run for this 
thesis to determine the long run relationship between investment and growth of GNP. 
China's unique history encompasses hundreds of years of rising and declining 
dynasties leaving a proud Sino-centric legacy that combined with a Century of Shame, 
resulting in a dissatisfied power that was ripe for a charismatic leader. Mao Zedong filled 
the role of the leader destined to take the PRC out of the Century of Shame. Mao 
developed a Marxist-Leninist ideology and used it to construct a communist system that 
partially mirrored the Soviet Union of the Cold War era. To the benefit of the Chinese, 
the PRC was more agrarian than the Soviet Union resulting in a surplus of labor that was 
a form of potential energy ready to contribute to economic growth. 
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When Deng took over, the PRC was in sound macroeconomic shape. He 
instituted land reform and increased exposure to foreign trade and investment. Deng 
desired to move away from the traditional PRC extensive growth model and improve' 
productivity. He recognized the benefits of standard of living increases that neighboring 
countries, the Asian Tigers, were realizing and he desired the same for the PRe. This 
was a big change for the Communist economic system of the PRe. 
The PRC economic reform period consisted of three phases of reforms, each 
instituted as the PRC economy began to overheat and inflation increase. Each new phase 
of reforms accomplished its goal of reducing inflation and sustaining high growth. An 
area in which reforms were attempted but not successful was the SOEs. SOEs remain a 
major source of waste and inefficiencies to this day. They do, however, provide 
employment for millions of workers, and this makes reforms that eliminate or restructure 
SOEs controversial and difficult to institute because of the resulting rises in the number 
of unemployed. The reforms that were instituted established a healthy non-state sector 
and profitable TVEs that occupy a niche in the middle ground between the State and non-
state sectors. Deng's reforms have been criticized by some as haphazard and 
characterized by the Chinese term moshitouguohe or crossing the river by groping for 
stones along the way. It is hard to be too critical of Deng's reforms because the PRC has 
realized growth levels of nine percent per year since 1978. 
A sizeable amount of literature has been published concerning the PRC in the 
period after the initiation of refomis; predictions concerning future growth have been 
widely varied. Zuliu Hu and Mohsin Kahn published a working paper for the IMF 
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reporting that a significant portion of PRC reforms came from increased productivity as 
underemployed agriculture workers moved to more industrial jobs and the PRC emerged 
in the world marketplace. Jeffrey Sachs and Wing Thye Woo, working for the National 
Bureau of Economic Research, attribute the PRC's growth solely to its exposure to 
foreign trade and a "harmonization" with its capitalist neighbors. These two theories are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive because they both attribute growth to a reallocation of 
the workforce and opening of trade, although they differ concerning the SOE sector. Hu 
and Khan recognized productivity gains in many sectors of the PRC economy, including 
the SOEs. Sachs and Woo believe that the SOE sector is a major source of drag and no 
productivity gains were realized in that area.91 
The Rand Company sponsored a study of economic and military trends in 1989 
that forecasted future economic· growth for several countries including the PRC. The 
1989 study predicted 4.7 percent growth for the period 1990-2000. Rand again 
sponsored an economic and military trend study by several of the same authors using the 
same method. This time the forecast developed two scenarios, one with stable growth 
predicting 4.9 percent growth (1994-2015), and a second disrupted growth scenario that 
forecast 3 percent growth over the same period. The authors conceded that their 
estimates were probably low. 
An autoregressive-distributed lag method with an error correction model was used 
to forecast GNP growth using its long run correlation with investment. Three scenarios 
were constructed using high, medium and low growth patterns. The high and low 
91 Sachs and Woo, ''Understanding China's Economic Performance." 
77 
scenarios fit within the boundaries of established investment as a percentage of GNP in 
PRC history. 
The future of PRC growth depends on a combination of internal and external 
factors and developments. Internal factors include human capital, SOEs, industrial and 
manufacturing, agriculture, infrastructure development, financial and service sector 
development, and political stability. External developments include PRC integration into 
the world economy and the Asian economic crisis. In order for the PRC to experience 
the high growth scenario, these items and developments must remain stable and positive. 
Major difficulties with any of the listed issues and the PRC will experience low growth. 
The likely scenario is somewhere in between. 
Sino-US relations seem to be at the high end of a cyclical pattern. Economic 
policy is often used as a tool to develop foreign policy in areas such as weapons 
proliferation and human rights. President Clinton's administration is pursuing a policy of 
engagement that is designed to work with PRC leaders fostering a move away from 
traditional Communism and toward a free market economy and, hopefully, democracy. 
This assessment of the PRC economy shows a system,that has progressed through 
several stages and has demonstrated sound macroeconomic policies. This has continued 
despite the Asian economic crisis and the resulting decrease in market demand. The 
growth is from increases in productivity and has taken advantage of underemployed 
workers and opening of trade. The PRC faces substantial problems both from within its 
borders and outside. The country has a history of major problems and disruptions yet it 
78 
r-------------
still realizes economic growth. The conclusion of this thesis is that the economic growth 





APPENDIX: FORECAST DATA 
Table 7 is the tabulated results of the ARDL forecast. Table 8 is the data file used 
in the ARDL exercise. 
Table 7. ARDL Forecast for PRC GNP 
Results in 1987 Yuan (trillions) 
Year Low Estimate Medium Estimate High Estimate 
1996 2.82 2.86 2.90 
1997 3.05 3.15 3.26 
1998 3.28 3.47 3.66 
1999 3.51 3.77 4.07 
2000 3.74 4.11 4.53 
2001 3.96 4.47 5.06 
2002 4.19 4.86 5.65 
2003 4.42 5.26 6.28 
2004 4.65 5.69 6.98 
2005 4.89 6.14 7.76 
2006 5.13 6.64 8.64 
2007 5.38 7.16 9.60 
2008 5.63 7.72 10.70 
2009 5.88 8.32 11.80 
2010 6.15 8.97 13.20 
Table 8 data from 1970 to 1995 entered from World Bank World Tables (1997 
CDROM edition). Data from 1996 to 2010 derived usirig 11 percent increase for GDI, 4 
percent increase for GDIl, and 7.55 percent increase for GDI2. Intpt is the intercept 
point for the ARDL model. 
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Table 8. Input-data for ARDL Model 
GNP and GDI data in 1987 Yuan (trillion) 
Year GNP GDI GDII GDI2 INT 
1970 3.753 0.987 0.987 0.987 1 
1971 3.753 1.089 1.089 1.089 1 
1972 3.753 1.054 1.054 1.054 1 
1973 4.065 1.230 1.230 1.230 1 
1974 4.108 1.251 1.251 1.251 1 
1975 4.448 1.406 1.406 1.406 1 
1976 4.207 1.281 1.281 1.281 1 
1977 4.539 1.435 1.435 1.435 1 
1978 5.169 1.977 1.977 1.977 1 
1979 5.566 2.042 2.042 2.042 1 
1980 6.047 2.122 2.122 2.122 1 
1981 6.297 2.049 2.049 2.049 
1982 6.806 2.273 2.273 2.273 
1983 7.503 2.546 2.546 2.546 1 
1984 8.645 2.988 2.988 2.988 1 
1985 9.833 3.721 3.721 3.721 1 
1986 10.700 4.041 4.041 4.041 1 
1987 11.950 4.322 4.322 4.322 1 
1988- 13.330 4.901 4.991 4.901 'I 
1989 13.880 4.996 4.996 4.996 1 
1990 14.420 4.998 4.998 4.998 1 
1991 15.780 5.463 5.463 5.463 1 
1992 18.080 6.131 6.131 6.131 1 
1993 20.570 7.649 7.649 7.649 1 
1994 23.240 8.455 8.455 8.455 1 
1995 25.620 10.070 10.070 10.070 1 
1996 11.180 10.470 10.830 1 
1997 12.410 10.890 11.640 1 
1998 13.770 11.330 12.510 1 
1999 15.290 11.780 13.450 1 
2000 16.970 12.250 14.460 1 
2001 18.840 12.740 15.540 1 
2002 20.910 13.250 16.710 1 
2003 23.210 13.780 17.960 1 
2004 25.760 14.340 19.310 1 
2005 28.600 14.910 20.760 1 
2006 31.740 15.500 22.310 1 
2007 35.230 16.120 23.990 1 
2008 39.110 16.770 25.790 1 
2009 43.410 17.440 -27.720 1 
2010 48.190 18.140 29.800 1 
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